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ABSTRACT
Deeper penetration of renewable resources is increasing the operational ramp-
ing requirements of actual power systems. The increase in renewable energy
resources and, more generally, variable energy resources has been identified
by ISOs and academics alike as a defining factor for the need of increased
ramping resources in power grids. In addition, concerns about the availability
of conventional dispatchable generation during harsh climatic conditions and
fuel shortages are starting to be raised. Ramping capability products (RCPs)
are the current solution being developed to solve these issues and tackle the
increasing randomness and variability in today’s power systems. They aim
to provide short-term ramping capability to operators to meet forecasted and
unforecasted ramping demand while they economically reward the provision
of the ramping capability and as a consequence explicitly reward the flexi-
bility of the resources supplying it. The motivation of these studies lies in
the assessment of the economic impacts of such products on a large-scale
system. We construct a flexible stochastic multi-settlement market simula-
tion approach which explicitly represents the RCPs and takes into account
current market designs and the regulatory environment for such purpose.
Through the case studies performed, we pinpoint the ability of the RCPs
to reduce price volatility resulting from the additional supply of ramp. Ex-
tremely high price events are reduced to the expense of an increase in prices
during low net load periods. Additionally, we illustrate that there is an in-
crease in reliability in the intra-day markets from the incorporation of the
RCPs through a reduction in the expected unserved energy. Furthermore, we
find the limitation of the RCPs to substitute other capacity-based products
in the RTM as the provision of ramping need not mean that additional ca-
pacity is also supplied. Regarding the payments to the sellers, we show that
RCPs effectively unbundle the provision of energy and ramping capability.
Based on these results, we conclude that a market structure which includes
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RCPs is subject to smoother prices and sees a reduction in price spike events
caused by the punctual lack of ramp due to the sources of uncertainty in
our system: the wind output and the solar output. From the reduction in
price volatility at the expense of an increase in average prices across low net
load periods, we conclude that for smoother operations and market perfor-
mance, market designs should include incentives in high volatility periods.
Such products inherently provide the system with ramping reserve which
equips the system operator with additional levels of freedom when trying to
maintain the power balance. In addition, we illustrate through the hydro re-
sources modeled and through the impact of its energy offering strategy that
given the unique nature of storage and its ability to provide ramp, there will
still be a big unknown impact of this technology on RCPs. Such impact
will directly affect market settlements with a time horizon which concords
with the physical capabilities of the energy storage resources (ESR). As a
consequence, RCP designs need to be accommodated to integrate the vari-
ous ESR technologies in order to profit from their potential. In addition, we
have shown the limited impact of the RCPs in real-time markets. The lack
of reserve capacity is a bigger constraint in such markets as the provision of
ramping capability need not mean that capacity is also provisioned. Derived
from this conclusion, the need to assess the market interactions of the various
capacity-based ancillary services arises. Such interactions will enable one to
determine the appropriate market rules and structure to ensure correct oper-
ation and increased reliability in the system. Regarding the payments to the
sellers, we show that the incorporation of the RCPs provides an incentive
to the sellers to participate in offering the products as there is an increase
in the payments to such sellers when these are incorporated. The RCPs ef-
fectively unbundle the provision of energy and ramp, rewarding the sellers
separately for each product and yielding clearer and more competitive prices
for them. Still, with current market designs, complete competitiveness can-
not be achieved. A socialization of the uplift payment allocation is needed
to allow units producing for short periods to economically participate in the
system. Overall, through the various points made, we conclude that RCPs
need to be considered, designed and improved not in isolation but in the
context of a holistic market re-design.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we set the stage for the work presented in this thesis. Our
research interest lies in the assessment of the economic impacts of ramping
capability products (RCPs) in the wholesale electricity markets. We start by
discussing the motivation for, and the background behind, the work so as to
allow the reader to better understand the nature of the problem considered
and the assessment we perform. We include a comparative analysis of the
current initiatives underway to develop RCPs in the American ISOs. We
also provide a brief summary of the current state-of-the-art in the field of op-
erational ramping and market-based solutions to tackle operational ramping
both in the academy and in industry. We then summarize the scope and the
contribution of this work and outline the contents of the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Deeper penetration of renewable resources is increasing the operational ramp-
ing requirements of actual power systems. The increase in renewable energy
resources and, more generally, variable energy resources (VERs) has been
identified by ISOs and academics alike as a defining factor for the need
of increased ramping resources in power grids [1–3]. In addition, concerns
about the availability of conventional dispatchable generation during harsh
climatic conditions and fuel shortages are starting to be raised. In this sec-
tion we describe the background on the increase of the operational ramping
requirements. Through the background we explain the motivation behind
market-based solutions to this problem.
Among VERs, solar and wind power, due to their special operational char-
acteristics, are the types of generation which increase ramping requirements.
Wind generation increases ramping requirements in a short-term minute time
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scale due to the randomness in wind availability. Furthermore, the limited
predictability of wind speeds results in different amounts of hard-to-predict
output wind generation every day. Solar generation has a characteristic
mountain-shaped daily generation pattern matching solar light hours. When
both are combined with the typical daily load profile curve in a net load
curve, the resulting ramping requirements increase greatly from the original
load profile. CAISO in [4] has estimated that, given the current regulatory
environment, in 2020 ramping requirements due to solar and wind effects
will increase by 6,300 MW in the morning (2-hour downward ramp) and by
7,500 MW in the afternoon (2-hour upward ramp). ERCOT in [5] estimates
that by 2029 ramping requirements will increase by 8,200 MW for the 3-
hour morning downward ramp and by 10,000 MW for the 3-hour afternoon
upward.
This deepening penetration of VERs has come as a result of regulators’
and policymakers’ aim to cut carbon emissions in the US as analyzed in [6].
The intended reduction has led to the enactment of a series of policies and
regulations at both the federal and state levels affecting the power systems.
In parallel, the reduction of unitary costs for VERs has further fueled their
penetration. According to NREL [7], reported prices for residential and com-
mercial photo-voltaic systems steadily declined at an average rate of 6%-7%
from 1998 to 2013. The land-based wind’s levelized cost of energy has also
declined from an average of $78/MWh in 2010 to $66/MWh in 2013 [8].
All in all, policies and reductions in unitary costs led to a CAGR in variable
renewable generation of 28% (wind and solar/PV) from 2000 to 2014 in the
US [9]. Hence, variable renewable penetration increased in total generation
from 9% to 13% in the same period [9]. Furthermore, VER penetration is
estimated to keep increasing as stated by the EIA in [10] to 18% of total
generation by 2040. The increase, as seen in this section, will pose a major
ramping challenge for ISOs and RTOs if they are to maintain reliability and
robustness of the grids.
Parallel to the increase in VER penetration, generation from conventional
resources has been jeopardized in one main front. Over the short term, harsh
climatic events such as polar vortexes or hurricanes have led to temporary
fuel shortages or equipment malfunctioning [11]. Reduction in conventional
generation decreases reliability through decreased availability of dispatchable
generation and increased overall system variability and randomness. The
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fuel supply for power plants is increasingly vulnerable to these events as
the power systems shift to more gas-fired plants. As acknowledged by the
Department of Energy in [12], a total of nine natural disasters have the
potential and likelihood to impact fuel supply at a significant scale that could
disrupt electric power supply. Loss of electrical power sits at the top of the
vulnerabilities resulting from a disruption in the fuel supply due to a severe
climatic event. Furthermore, harsh climate events have the ability to disrupt
regular operations in power plants due to malfunctioning equipment. During
the 2014 polar vortex, NERC declared an ERO Event of Level 5 which is
equivalent to the unintended loss of more than 10,000 MW of generation in
the affected areas [11].
Traditional power systems have been characterized by a high degree of
load predictability and sufficient generation flexibility to cope with systems’
ramping needs. Conventional energy resources have so far been able to ad-
just to system variability thanks to operating reserves in real-time operations
and unit dispatch and commitment in daily and intra-daily intervals. The
new factors described above have started to jeopardize the system’s ability
to respond in a reliable manner to the daily ramping requirements. As dis-
cussed in [3,13] these factors have created the need for increased operational
flexibility in the power system. In a context where electricity is traded in a
competitive market environment, the lack of flexibility is starting to impact
markets through an increase in the frequency of the so called scarcity price
events or price spikes. In these events, a lack of operating system flexibility
causes energy and/or ancillary service prices to steeply rise for a short period
of time. This has a significant impact on average market clearing prices and
on total system payments. For instance, as shown in [14], price spikes in
the ERCOT increased the average market clearing price an average of 14.7%
for the years 2012 to 2014. Furthermore, the CAISO now regularly reports
statistics on the price variability and price spike frequency as in [15]. It is
clear that there is an increasing need for operating ramping flexibility which
has to be sought through a market-based solution.
Multiple market-based solutions have been proposed to solve the increased
operating ramping requirement. These fall into three categories: increasing
existing ancillary service requirements, implementing changes in the market
clearing mechanisms to explicitly account for increased ramping requirements
and developing new ancillary service products that supply the ramping ca-
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pability required. These solutions have been considered by both the ISOs
and academics, as we discuss in Section 1.3. Increasing the existing ancillary
service requirements encounters a series of issues. Regarding regulation, the
technical constraints to provide such product are restrictive and would not,
in most systems, the provision of significant additional ramping capability.
In addition, using regulation or other capacity-based ancillary services as
spinning reserves to source ramping capability would create unique products
that serve two different purposes. This would not allow the market to yield
the appropriate value to each service. In terms of implementing changes in
the market clearing mechanisms, two main solutions have been proposed:
implementing a multi-interval time-coupled dispatch and adding an explicit
ramping constraint to the clearing mechanism that requires it to maintain
a ramping reserve. The multi-interval time-coupled dispatch (or look-ahead
dispatch) allows one to tackle ramping requirements that are perfectly fore-
casted. It fails, though, to explicitly provide ramping capability to cope with
deviations in the forecasts. This issue is solved with the implementation of
an explicit ramping constraint to the clearing mechanism that requires it to
maintain a ramping reserve. Despite this potential, both market designs fail
to provide an explicit economic incentive to market players to supply ramp-
ing capability from existing resources or to invest in new flexible resources.
Ramping capability products are the current solution being developed to
solve these issues and tackle the increasing randomness and variability in the
actual power systems. They aim to provide short-term ramping capability
to operators to meet forecasted and unforecasted ramping demand. In addi-
tion, they aim to economically reward the provision of the ramping capability
and as a consequence explicitly reward the flexibility of the resources. It is
intended that these products will support the deployment of fast ramping
resources over the long term.
In the next section we provide an overview of the current initiatives to de-
velop ramping capability products in the American ISOs and related product
designs.
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1.2 Comparative Analysis of the Existing RCP
Initiatives
The purpose of this section is to compare the RCP initiatives across the
American ISOs in order to enable its mathematical modeling in the following
chapters. For the analysis, current RCP initiatives underway at CAISO and
MISO are considered. The multiple features that characterize each RCP
design are compared and assessed.
In recent years, both CAISO and MISO have started initiatives to tackle
the increasing ramping requirements driven by the deepening penetration
of VERs. These initiatives have evolved towards the creation of specific
ramping products. In CAISO the process began in 2011. After the approval
of the flexible ramping constraint interim compensation methodology, CAISO
committed to develop a stakeholders’ initiative to create a ramping capability
product that would allow for the purchase of enough ramping capability
through economic bids. In February 2016, CAISO ’s Board of Governors
voted to start the filings with FERC in order to implement the RCP in the
market. In parallel, MISO started the development of its ramping capability
product in 2011 to address unanticipated ramp demands [16]. MISO prepared
the final FERC filings for effective implementation of the RCP on April 1
2016. In the following subsections the multiple features of both products
are compared and analyzed. This comparison focuses on qualitative design
characteristics.
In terms of motivation for the initiative, CAISO ’s development of RCPs
is motivated by the increased levels of variable energy resources. Increased
generation from VERs increases both the forecasted and unexpected net
load changes in the 5-minute to 5-minute subperiods. As seen in Fig. 1.1,
CAISO ’s net load forecasts predict significantly higher ramping requirements
by 2020. MISO ’s motivation to develop an RCP is mainly driven by the
need to respond to load forecast errors. Other factors were acknowledged
by the MISO such as deepening VER penetration, changes in interchange
scheduling rules or fuel price variations. Despite that, the load was the
biggest contributor to variability in terms of net load uncertainty and the
main motivator for them to develop the product.
The main objective of the RCP designed by CAISO is to provision ramp-
ing capability to meet both forecasted and unexpected variations in net load
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Figure 1.1: CAISO duck curve [4]
between intervals in the real-time market (RTM ) and the fifteen-minute mar-
ket (FMM ). In this point lies the main difference with regulation. Whereas
regulation is intended to meet deviations in net load inside intervals, the RCP
is designed to help cope with deviations between intervals. MISO ’s aim is
the same with the exception that RCPs are not included in a sub-hourly
market since the MISO does not currently have such a market. Instead, the
RCPs are purchased in the DAM.
Regarding market integration, in the CAISO the RCPs will be integrated
into the Fifteen Minute Market (FMM ) and the real-time market (RTM ).
This means that the RCP will be co-optimized with energy and other an-
cillary services in those markets. Granularity will match that used in each
market: fifteen minutes for the FMM and five minutes for the RTM. No
bids for RCP will be allowed in the day-ahead market. Awards in the FMM
and RTM will be financially binding. The ramping capability requirements
associated with the RCP in the RTM will be incremental from the IDM. For
the MISO, the RCP will be integrated into the DAM and the RTM. The
bids in the DAM will not be economically binding whereas bids in the RTM
will be so.
Regarding the suppliers for the products, in the CAISO any dispatchable
resource including Dispatchable Intermittent Resources (DIR) able to meet 5
minute dispatch instructions will be able to offer RCPs. Variable Intermit-
tent Resources (VIRs) such as wind or solar will be allowed to bid for RCPs
6
but will be assessed based on CAISO ’s internal Dispatch Operating Target
instead of the forecast made by the resource. No special consideration is
given to DRR or ESR. If they qualify as DIR, they will be able to partic-
ipate. The MISO allows any dispatchable resource able to meet 5 minute
dispatch instructions to offer RCPs. Nevertheless, a series of exceptions is
made. DRR of Type I, which are mostly residential resources, will not be
able to offer RCPs. In addition, it is considered that short-term ESR cannot
sustain ramp for long periods of time and also have a higher profitability
offering for regulation and thus will not be allowed to offer RCPs. VIRs are
banned from offering RCPs in the up direction but can do so in the down
direction. Participation in the supply of RCPs through offers is voluntary in
both ISOs.
Upon supply of the product, the cost derived by the offers cleared is al-
located. In the CAISO, the costs of the RCP will be borne by all market
participants: load, inter-tie and supply. The ramping requirements derived
from forecasted movements will be paid by the causing participant of the
movement at the market prices. The cost derived from ramping require-
ments caused by unforecasted demand or supply deviations will be allocated
monthly to the resources contributing to the unforecasted variability. In
MISO, the whole cost will be borne by load and exports. This decision fol-
lows MISO ’s principle to allocate the costs to the participants that benefit
from the product. MISO argues that 90% of the need for RCPs in terms of
ramping requirements comes from load and net scheduled interchanges. In
addition, they consider that a fairer approach would require a highly complex
rate design. As a consequence allocation by benefit is selected.
1.3 A Survey of the State of the Art
Operational ramping flexibility in power systems has been the subject of
much discussion recently with the deepening penetration of VERs as shown
in Section 1.1. Multiple papers and reports have discussed and to some extent
quantified the economic impacts of various market solutions for managing
operational ramping flexibility. In this section, we give an overview of the
literature related to operational ramping flexibility and the studies performed
on how to economically tackle it.
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In the industry, numerous reports address the topic of operational ramping
flexibility. Such reports generally fall into two categories: operational flex-
ibility assessments and market-oriented solutions for ramping management.
In [3], Cochran et al. develop a framework to measure and analyze flexibility.
Kirby and Milligan develop a method to estimate ramping capability and as-
sess the ramping capability requirements in PJM, CAISO and WAPA in [17].
Regarding market-oriented solutions the CAISO has published designs for its
ramping constraint and ramping product in [18, 19]. The MISO has set up
the so-called Ramp Management - Strategic Initiative and has developed its
own ramp capability product [20].
Navid and Rosenwald in [20] compare the economic impacts of ramp capa-
bility products between a single interval dispatch and a multi-interval time-
coupled dispatch in a five-generator system. The design requirements for a
reliable and efficient ramp capability product are explored by Wang et al.
in [21] through a simulation-based optimization method. Zhang and McCal-
ley in [22] explore the economic impacts of a stochastic look-ahead economic
dispatch with ramping capability products. Taking the same approach, Wang
and Hobbs in [23] compare the economic impacts of a deterministic dispatch
which includes flexible ramping products with those of a stochastic dispatch
on a two-generator system. Across these studies, authors demonstrate the
capability of the ramping capability product to reduce price spikes on small-
scale systems.
Other scheduling approaches have been proposed to manage ramping re-
quirements. Thatte et al. propose a robust optimization based economic dis-
patch to manage system ramping requirements and compare the approach to
ramp capability products in [24]. Marneris et al. in [25] propose an integrated
scheduling approach based on the European Central Dispatch system which
employs multi-interval scheduling and allows for the optimal procurement of
ramping products.
Finally, numerous metrics and approaches have been proposed to measure
operational flexibility in power systems. In [26], Ulbig and Andersson propose
a new methodology to assess the available technical operational flexibility
and conduct extensive testing in the German power system. Lannoye et al.
in [27] propose a new metric for flexibility: the insufficient ramping resource
expectation.
Until now there has been little work that assesses the economic impacts
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of RCPs on a large-scale system. Moreover, to our knowledge, the impact of
these products in a multi-settlement market has not been studied in depth.
No studies have been published that compare the impacts in detail in terms
of different payments to the sellers.
1.4 The Scope and Nature of the Contributions of
the Thesis
In this work, we provide an economic assessment of the impacts of the RCPs
across a multi-settlement market structure for a large-scale system. In order
to perform the assessment, we construct a flexible stochastic multi-settlement
market simulation approach which explicitly represents the RCPs and takes
into account current market designs and the regulatory environment.
In our studies, we co-optimize the provision of energy and RCPs on a large-
scale system we model for the purpose. Our studies are based in a stochastic
simulation approach that relies on the Monte Carlo technique. We perform
our co-optimization across three market settlements; the DAM and two sub-
hourly markets. We incorporate forecasting error in order to account for the
uncertainties of the demand and VERs forecasts. We take into account the
impact of the products in both commitment and dispatch processes. We do
not consider network constraints in our system.
This work makes several contributions to the state of the art. Our multi-
settlement market structure represents the salient aspects of the current sub-
hourly market designs. The structure explicitly incorporates the RCPs which
allows for the compared assessment. In addition, it incorporates the temporal
differences associated with the market inputs in the form of forecast errors
and different market-settlement offers. This flexible approach provides stake-
holders a means to develop a deeper understanding of the economic impacts
of not only RCPs but any product or resource that interacts across a multi-
settlement market. Furthermore, we model a large-scale system that mimics
the CAISO generation fleet which allows us to perform our simulation for
both unit commitment processes as well as economic dispatch processes. This
system has the potential to be used in multiple types of studies both with and
without the developed multi-settlement market structure to assess impacts
in large-scale systems.
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We apply the stochastic simulation approach to perform an economic as-
sessment of the impacts of the RCPs in the sub-hourly markets. In our
studies we investigate the impact in sub-hourly market clearing prices from
the introduction of RCPs. Additionally, we quantify the impacts of such
products in the total payments to the generation and the uplift payments
across different types of generation resources. We make use of the large-scale
system developed and historical CAISO forecasts data to perform our case
studies. We summarize our key insights as follows:
• RCPs reduce price volatility in the sub-hourly market as given by a
56.6 % reduction in market clearing price standard deviation.
• RCPs reduce annual expected average market clearing prices by 6.2 %.
• RCPs reduce the frequency of price spikes as well as expected unserved
energy across the sub-hourly market providing an increase in the system
reliability.
• The purchase of RCPs in the sub-hourly markets does not imply a
increase in the capacity in the system but only an increase in ramping
capability.
• Real-time market impacts of the implementation of RCPs are limited
without additional operating reserve capacity.
• RCPs increase the energy payments to sellers by only 0.1 % and the
uplift payments to sellers by 80.0 %. Total payments to the sellers
increase an expected 5.0 %.
• The nature of the increases in the payments to the sellers gives an incen-
tive to those supplying ramp to offer RCPs as it provides a distinctive
value to such capability.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis consists of five additional chapters and four appendices.
In Chapter 2, we discuss the nature of the multi-market settlement prob-
lem. We describe the stochastic nature of actual power systems and discuss
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the limitations of traditional power system operation tools to deal with it.
We relate the power system operations to the current market-based frame-
work governing the economics of actual power systems. Based on all these,
we propose a multi-market settlement structure for our studies.
In Chapter 3, we develop a mathematical model to integrate the RCPs in a
market structure. We then develop mathematically a multi-settlement mar-
ket structure which includes the RCPs. We complete the chapter presenting
a post-market settlement for our multi-settlement market structure.
In Chapter 4, we give an in-depth description of the stochastic simulation
approach which is the basis of our RCP economic impact analysis. We begin
by describing the temporal structure of our simulation approach. We then
describe the use of the Monte Carlo technique in our DAM and present
the classification methods we use in our inputs. We discuss the simulation
approach for our sub-hourly market settlements. We end the chapter with
the description of a Markov-based method to model forecast error.
In Chapter 5, we discuss the case studies performed to assess the economic
impacts of the RCPs. We describe the nature and scope of our case stud-
ies. Then, we describe the large-scale system we develop to perform our case
studies. In addition, we present representative results for the extensive stud-
ies we have carried out on our large-scale system using real CAISO data to
perform the economic assessment of the RCPs.
In Chapter 6, we summarize the main results of the thesis and point out
directions for future research.
Appendix A provides a summary of the notation used in the formulation of
the market clearing mechanisms (MCM s), the formulation of the settlement
model and the description of the simulation approach. Appendix B depicts a
numerically rich figure of the multi-settlement market structure. In Appendix
C, we characterize the technical data used to model the resources for our case
studies. We devote Appendix D to describing the computational statistics of
our simulations.
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CHAPTER 2
THE NATURE OF THE
MULTI-SETTLEMENT MARKET
PROBLEM
We devote this chapter to describing the nature of the multi-settlement mar-
ket problem. We begin to describe the root cause which requires such struc-
ture to be implemented in electricity markets: the increase in stochasticity
in power systems. In addition, we describe the various techniques used to
model such stochasticity which allow us to ascertain its effect in the power
system. Once we understand such effects, we describe the power system op-
eration levers that enable power system operators to address them. We then
connect such levers to the current energy market framework present in most
power systems with the description of the relationship of power system oper-
ations to market settlements and in particular to multi-market settlements.
We then present a multi-market settlement structure which is the basis of
our studies.
2.1 Stochastic Nature of Power Systems with Deep
VER Penetration
This section discusses the sources of stochasticity in power systems with a
focus on VERs given the deepening penetration mentioned in Sec. 1.1. We
present mathematically the sources of uncertainty and its impacts in the
power system.
Traditionally, power systems have been operated around the assumption
that the inputs to the system were of a deterministic nature and that un-
certainty was limited. The three main sources of operational uncertainty
were generation availability, transmission availability and demand forecast
errors. Transmission availability is not discussed in this thesis. The model-
ing techniques of its availability are generally analogous to those of generation
availability described here.
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In general, from a forecasted demand in any period of time, a deviation
from the forecast would cause an imbalance in the power system which has
to be corrected by either changing some units’ outputs or allowing them
to have unserved energy. To enable planning and scheduling, demand has
been forecasted using mainly two types of techniques as explained in [28]:
time-series analysis and econometric analysis. Time-series analysis uses nu-
merical methods such as regressions or frequency fitting to forecast mainly
short-term demand. This method is based on historical data. Econometric
analysis is based on the economic and social drivers which lead to electric-
ity demand. Plotted in Fig. 2.1 are the CAISO day-ahead and hour-ahead
forecasts and the real demand in its footprint. Deviations from forecast in
demand are smooth and occur over periods of hours. In terms of ramping,
these deviations do not pose a significant challenge to operators.
Figure 2.1: CAISO demand forecasts and actual consumption for October
30, 2015 [29]
The second source of uncertainty is generation availability. A sudden out-
age in a committed unit causes the unit which is committed to become un-
available. This would lead to a sudden decrease in available generation and
in output and, as a consequence, an imbalance in the power balance. Given
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the low concentration of capacity in a single unit and the small forced outage
rate FOR for units, generation outages have been tackled using deterministic
approaches in planning and scheduling. N-1 and N-2 type contingency anal-
ysis are the common tools used by system operators to model and prepare
for the effects of generation outages.
Most recently, the deepening penetration of VERs has led to the increase of
uncertainty inherent mainly to two of these types of power generation: wind
and solar generation. Shown in Fig. 2.2 are the hourly wind output patterns
in CAISO for the month of September 2015. Two characteristic traits of such
generation can be observed. There is no apparent pattern arising from this
type of generation, which leads to an increased complication in its forecast.
Secondly, there is an intermittent nature to the generation with sudden step
drops in output.
Figure 2.2: CAISO September 2015 wind output hourly patterns
Solar generation, as shown in Fig. 2.3, can be forecasted with least error
as its pattern is more foreseeable. Despite this, cloud cover can also cause
intermittent sudden drops in output as shown in Fig. 2.4. Intermittency
from both sources leads to the mentioned power imbalances. The system
needs to have enough capacity on-line to cope with such imbalances and,
more importantly, do so in a timely manner. This translates into ramping
requirements which need to be met to avoid having unserved energy or, worse,
a loss of load event.
In order to plan daily unit scheduling and commitments, both resources
have been forecasted using different approaches. Given the high uncertainty
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Figure 2.3: CAISO September 2015 solar output hourly patterns
Figure 2.4: Measured power output from a 1 MW PV CdTe array
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with deep penetration of such resources, deterministic approaches cannot be
used and as such stochastic approaches are needed. The most common ap-
proaches fall in two categories: modeling output as a random process and
using historical output data. The first approach is more common to wind
output whereas the second is mostly used for solar output. When using
historical data, datasets are built to the highest degree possible to reflect
conditions being studied. For such purpose, clustering and classification of
profiles according to season, weather conditions or geographical placement
are common techniques used. In addition, techniques such as Monte Carlo
simulation are used. These ensure that the studies being performed account
for the highest possible degree of uncertainty inherent to the datasets used,
and in a computationally efficient manner. When modeling intermittent gen-
eration as a random process, various techniques have been widely studied and
discussed in the literature. Some relevant ones are mentioned as examples.
The Kernel density estimation characterizes output as a stationary random
process following a parametric distribution. The Markov chain model char-
acterizes output as a non-time-homogeneous disaggregated random process.
Time-varying autoregressive processes model output also both as stationary
processes (auto-regressive, moving-average and the combination of both) and
as non-stationary process (Box-Jenkins). More modern techniques include
neural networks and machine learning.
2.2 Limitation of Traditional Power System
Operations Tools to Deal with Stochasticity
Stochasticity, as seen in Section 2.1, causes deviations in the power balance
either through a difference in generation or in demand. These differences
have a direct effect in the frequency of the power system and can result
in partial loss of load events or in blackouts. To avoid such consequences,
system operators use a series of tools and processes to resolve power balance
deviations and ensure demand is met. These tools need to provide both
sufficient ramp and energy to cope with deviations. In addition, they need
to observe the temporal constraints of the various generation and demand
elements. In this section, we review processes and tools available to deal with
the effects of stochasticity, starting with those used to deal with deviations
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in the shortest time horizon and continuing to the longest. We categorize
these tools based on the reason for their use: non-event and event motivated
usage. We consider an event as the sudden unexpected loss of a generating
unit, transmission element or demand element. Overall, we make use of this
review to highlight the limitation of these tools and processes under current
deep VER penetration scenarios.
After a deviation in the power balance, the first elements to intervene to
regulate it are the rotating masses from the generation units. The energy
stored through the inertia of rotating mases either increases or decreases to
close the deviation. Physically, this increases or decreases their speed respec-
tively. If the deviation is not closed with it, the automatic generation control
(AGC ) intervenes. The AGC senses the change in the system’s frequency
and automatically sets the governor control of the units connected to the
system to modify their output to close the deviation. Additionally, if the
deviation is not closed, operators manually dispatch units up or down. ISOs
commit different levels of operating reserve capacity through the day-ahead
unit commitment and economic dispatch processes to ensure headroom ca-
pacity to cope with the deviations.
In parallel, after an event which causes a power imbalance, operators have
a series of capacity reserves which they use to solve the imbalance. The first
two types, which have already been described, are the inertial reserve of the
rotating mases and the so-called primary reserves deployed automatically by
the AGC. Inertial reserves kick in instantly after the event. Next, the AGC
is automatically deployed within seconds after the event. Then, within tens
of seconds up to around five minutes, secondary or spinning reserves are
deployed to substitute the primary reserves. Tertiary reserves with a start-
up time of fifteen to twenty minutes are deployed to replace the secondary
reserves. This stepped process gives operators enough time to manually
dispatch additional units to cope with the event.
These two types of processes and tools described have traditionally been
enough to meet deviation in forecast. With the deepening penetration of
VER, events where VER generation is lost or gained are increasingly more
frequent than conventional generation contingencies. As a consequence, pro-
cesses and reserves have been redesigned to adapt to this new paradigm
and to endow the system with higher flexibility. To benefit from closer-to-
dispatch forecasts, planning processes are now performed more often and
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closer in time to dispatch. Economic dispatch and unit commitment pro-
cesses are run intra-daily to adapt to changing forecasts and conditions. For
instance, in CAISO, the unit commitment is performed every 15 minutes and
the economic dispatch every 5 minutes. Furthermore, reserves have been re-
designed to include ramping reserves. These new reserves have helped cope
with the sudden drops caused by the intermittency of VER generation.
2.3 Relationship between Power System Operations
and the Market Settlements
We have to ensure that the appropriate degree of system capacity and flexi-
bility is sourced to cope with the effects of the stochasticity in power systems.
In current liberalized electricity market frameworks we have to harness com-
petitive forces so that the supply is at the most competitive economic level
possible. To ensure such capacity and flexibility is sourced, markets and
products are created for the purpose.
Until recently, ISOs ran day-ahead markets to acquire enough generation
to meet the next day’s demand. Through bids and offers in the market, gen-
eration units and load serving entities were dispatched and awarded based
on unit commitment and economic dispatch type processes. Additionally,
to ensure the system had enough reserves a series of auctions for the so-
called CBAS or capacity based ancillary services were held daily. The CBAS
sourced the required amounts of each of the reserves which the system re-
quired to meet deviation in the forecast and unforeseen events. With the
deepening penetration of VER, additional sub-hourly market processes have
been created to cope with the imbalances caused by the deviations in fore-
cast [30]. FERC has contributed to this creation with Orders 764, 888 and
890 [31]. As an example, these have allowed ISOs to apply charges for energy
imbalances, have forced them to offer intra-hour generation and transmission
scheduling and have forced VERs to provide their ISO meteorological and
forced outage data if available. All of these have driven electricity markets
into a multi-process multi-settlement structure across different time horizons.
This type of structure is now present in most of the American ISOs. For ex-
ample, CAISO has 288 real-time markets and 96 fifteen-minute markets per
day for imbalances, where commitment and dispatch processes and CBAS
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auctions are run. The MISO also has 288 real-time markets and CBAS auc-
tions to cope with imbalances. Similar structures are observed in the rest
of American ISOs. As described in 1, these market structures now include
RCPs to source ramping reserves to meet intermittent unexpected ramp-
ing requirements. In Section 2.4, we present the multi-settlement market
structure we use to assess the economic impacts of the RCPs.
2.4 Multi-Market Settlement Structure
In this section we describe the structure of the market processes involved in a
multi-market settlement structure. We discuss the motivations that lead us
to choose the particular market structure presented and the rationale for the
choice of each of its elements. We define as a market settlement each of the
temporally distinctive market clearing mechanisms with its own scheduling
optimization problems (SOPs) that determine market outcomes for the same
period in time.
As presented in Section 2.3, the deepening penetration of VERs has led
ISOs to create multiple market settlements across different time horizons
[30]. These new market designs have allowed ISOs to tackle part of the
intermittency and uncertainty associated with the VERs. The RCPs are the
latest development in this direction. To assess the impacts of such products
in a comprehensive manner so that we include the various time horizons,
we select a market structure comprised of multiple market settlements. Our
choice is in line with the market structure of CAISO and MISO, the first
developers of commercial RCPs.
The first settlement, which we call DAM, is the equivalent to the hourly
day-head market cleared in many existing ISOs in the United States and
other parts of the world. Such market settlement has been widely studied
in the literature and its main purpose is to obtain economically binding
generation schedules and commitments as well as electricity prices for the
next day based on a set of demand bids and supply offers [32]. The second
settlement is defined as the IDM which stands for sub-hourly market. The
third and last settlement is defined as the RTM which stands for real-time
market. The IDM and RTM are sub-hourly imbalance markets that allow
for intra-daily scheduling of deviations from the DAM. These settlements
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Figure 2.5: Market structure in the simulation approach
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must honor the DAM market outcomes. The market structure proposed is
presented in Fig. 2.5.
The DAM is modeled by means of a 24 subinterval SOP that emulates the
unit-commitment and economic dispatch of the day-ahead markets. The 24
hourly subintervals are equivalent to a full day and are the common choice
in the DAM. The purpose of this market, as stated before, is to obtain eco-
nomically binding generation schedules and commitments as well as market
clearing prices. The IDM is modeled with a time-coupled rolling SOP which
solves a short-term unit-commitment and an economic dispatch for the up-
dated demand and VER output forecasts. The look-ahead allows the com-
mitment of fast-start resources to tackle deviations in the forecasts from the
DAM. To end with, the RTM, by the means of a time-coupled rolling SOP,
solves an economic dispatch for the final updated forecasts. The sequence of
processes is shown in Fig. 2.6. Note that, as shown in Fig. 2.5, in the IDM
and the RTM only the first subinterval of each SOP is financially binding,
and thus is used to determine market outcomes. The remaining subintervals
are advisory and are not used to determine market outcomes.
RCPs are modeled in the IDM and the RTM to capture the economic im-
pacts of such products in both commitment and dispatch processes. Ramping
capability associated with the RCPs is purchased in the IDM and imbalance
ramping capability is purchased in the RTM.
After we obtain the RTM ’s market outcomes, we compute the total pay-
ments to the sellers across the hourly and sub-hourly market settlements in
order to obtain the global outcomes from the market structure. The compu-
tation of payments to the sellers is further discussed in Section 3.4. Upon the
development of the market structure, we present a mathematical formulation
of the integration of the RCPs into the market clearing mechanisms.
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Figure 2.6: Flowchart of the market processes
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CHAPTER 3
THE INTEGRATION OF THE RCPS INTO
A MULTI-SETTLEMENT MARKET
STRUCTURE
We devote this chapter to discuss the integration of the RCPs into the multi-
settlement market structure outlined in Chapter 2. We require of the for-
mulation of the multiple market clearing mechanisms associated with the
market settlements to explain how we obtain the various market outcomes
that are the basis of the performance metrics in our comparative economic
assessment of the impacts of the RCPs. We develop the mathematical model
of the RCPs in Section 3.1 and describe the formulation for their integration
into a market settlement. Furthermore, we provide the formulation of the
operating constraints imposed to each unit by the delivery of the ramping
capability associated with the RCPs. In Section 3.2, we formulate the market
clearing mechanism that corresponds to the DAM. We proceed to provide the
mathematical formulation for the market clearing mechanisms corresponding
to each of the sub-hourly market settlements. We then formulate the pay-
ments to the sellers in the hourly and sub-hourly market settlements that
allow us to interpret the outcomes of our proposed market structure.
To facilitate the formulation of the market processes associated with each
market settlement, we define L , {` : ` = 1, 2, 3} as the exhaustive set con-
taining all the market settlements. The superscript (·)(`) is used to represent
a specific market settlement across this work only where a distinction between
multiple market settlements is needed. Otherwise, the superscript is dropped
when such distinction is not required. We define k (`) as the indicator to a
subperiod corresponding to a single smallest indecomposable time interval
(s.i.t.i.) of market settlement (`). We refer to k (1), k (2) and k (3) as the
indicators to the subperiods corresponding to the s.i.t.i.s for the first, second
and third market settlements. We define F (`) ,
{
f (`) : f (`) = 1 , . . . , F (`)
}
as the set of cleared markets in a simulation period for market settlement
`. We define χ as the number of subperiods solved within each MCM. We
indicate with (·)A those subperiods for which the market outcomes are ad-
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visory and not financially binding and with (·)B for the financially binding
subperiods. Thus, we declare that the market clearing mechanism for the
cleared market f (`) in market settlement ` is solved over an optimization
period equal to:
H (`)
f (`)
,
{
k (`) : k (`) =
(
1 + (f (`) − 1) · (χ(`))B) , . . . ,
((χ(`))A + (χ(`))B − 1 + (f (`) − 1) · (χ(`))B}. (3.1)
Additionally, for all the market clearing mechanisms, we note that each
seller represents a single unit in the market. In addition, the set of sellers S
is the same for all market settlements.
3.1 Ramping Capability Product Integration
This section presents the mathematical formulation that enables the integra-
tion of the RCPs into the market structure. We model mathematically the
RCPs. We proceed to define each of the sellers’ RCP related parameters.
Furthermore, we model the additional operating constraints that the delivery
of the ramping capability associated to the RCP imposes on the resources
that provide it. We conclude by formulating the system-wide ramping capa-
bility demand balance equations.
The RCP is characterized by a triplet that consists of the ramp capability,
the direction, up or down, and the ramp duration. We define the ramp
direction with the superscripts (·) + for the up direction and (·) − for the
down direction. Ramp capability is defined in [MW/min] We define the
ramp duration as ∆ (`). The ramp duration represents the time interval
during which the ramping capability associated with the product must be
delivered.
We denote by (ρ s)(·) the RCP offer price function for seller s. We define
z s[k] as the amount of ramp capability provided by the unit of seller s in
subperiod k.
The ramp capability associated with the RCP provided by each unit of each
seller s must respect the operating constraints of the unit. Constraints (3.2)
and (3.3) represent the maximum and minimum output constraints of the
units, where (κ s) M and (κ s) m represent the maximum and minimum ca-
pacity for the unit of seller s and g s[k] represents the output in the subperiod
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k. Moreover, constraint (3.4) represents the unit’s ramping capability, where
r s is the maximum ramping capability for the unit. These constraints are
formulated as:
g s[k] + (z s) +[k] ≤ (κ s) M , ∀k ∈ Ti, ∀s ∈ S (3.2)
g s[k]− (z s) −[k] ≥ (κ s) m, ∀k ∈ Ti, ∀s ∈ S (3.3)
z s[k] ≤ ∆ · r s, ∀k ∈ Ti, ∀s ∈ S . (3.4)
Additionally, we need to define the non-negativity constraints for the ramp-
ing capability provided by the unit of each seller s :
z s[k] ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ Ti, ∀s ∈ S . (3.5)
In parallel, we have the ISO, who is the sole buyer of the RCPs. We
define as ξ[k] the system aggregated ramping capability demand associated
to the RCP in subperiod k. The RCP market balancing constraints are then
formulated through the following equality constraints:
∑
s∈S
z s[k] + (ξ)†[k] = ξ[k], ∀k ∈ Ti. (3.6)
The formulation of constraint (3.6) includes the possibility that part of
the ramping capability requirement may not be sourced and become unserved
ramping capability (ξ)†. This formulation can be further expanded to include
a probabilistic demand curve making use of so-called surplus variables as
defined in [33]. We avoid repetition and analogous equations in the up and
down directions are only formulated once. This is the case for Eqs.(3.4) -
(3.6).
3.2 Hourly DAM Market Clearing Mechanisms
In this section we present the market clearing mechanism formulations cor-
responding to the DAM market settlement. We begin by laying out the
assumptions we make in our clearing models. Next, we formulate the market
clearing mechanism that solves the unit commitment problem. Continuing,
we explain how we solve the economic dispatch from the formulated market
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clearing mechanism for the unit commitment.
Our development of the market formulation is based on two key assump-
tions:
A1. The demand has infinite willingness-to-buy.
A2. The transmission constraints are not binding on the grid and are
therefore not considered.
Assumption A1 allows us to reduce the requirements of the computation-
ally intensive MIP involved in the unit commitment. It also mimics the
outcomes of the two-stage process run by ISOs. In the first stage, bid-in de-
mand is cleared. In the second stage, the so-called reliability unit commitment
(RUC ) is solved to ensure that enough thermal generation is committed the
day ahead to meet the forecasted net demand [34] - [35]. The RUC solves a
market clearing mechanism with infinite willingness-to-buy from the buyers
up to the forecasted demand as illustrated in Fig. 3.1. This ensures that
ISOs are able to fulfill the must-meet requirement on the demand. Assump-
tion A2 furthermore allows us to implement our simulation approach in a
large-scale system as it reduces the computational requirements of the mar-
ket clearing mechanisms. The assumption, though, has an impact as it does
not take into account the deliverability of both the energy and the RCPs in a
transmission constraint system. It should be of interest for future studies to
incorporate both willingness-to-buy and network constraints to the proposed
market clearing mechanisms.
Figure 3.1: Residual unit commitment
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Note that the formulation and solution of the unit commitment problem
using multiple techniques has been widely studied in the literature. Further
details on the unit commitment formulation presented here and multiple
solving methods can be found in [28] and [36]. The notation for our proposed
formulation is listed in Appendix A.
We formulate the unit commitment market clearing mechanism for the
set of S sellers over a set of H (1) intervals. Since we assume unlimited
willingness-to-buy from the demand, our objective function can be expressed
as the minimization of the sum of each of the sellers’ energy offers γ s(·), unit
start-up offers ζ s and the penalty price α for the unserved energy (d) †[k] for
each subperiod k in each market run f. Our objective function is then:
min
g s[k],u s[k],
a s[k],(d) †[k]
∑
k∈H f
{∑
s∈S
(γ s(g s[k]) + ζ s · a s[k]) + α · (d) c[k]
}
, ∀f ∈ F .
(3.7)
These offer functions could be either positive or negative. As cost recovery
for the multiple units has to be ensured, for the great majority of the time
these will be positive. Although in two cases they might be negative. If
units have external incentives to operate, such as production tax credits,
these might reflect in negative offers. In addition, if the opportunity cost
of shutting down is higher than that of producing at a negative price (i.e.,
nuclear units) these might decide to offer energy also at a negative price.
The sum of the sellers’ unit outputs plus the wind and solar outputs must
meet our demand minus the unserved energy for all subperiods. We define
d[k] as the forecasted demand, w[k] as the forecasted wind output and n[k]
as the forecasted solar output for each subperiod k ∈ Ti:
∑
∀s∈S
g s[k] + w[k] + n[k] = d[k] + (d)c[k], ∀k ∈ Ti. (3.8)
In addition, the seller’s units are subject to the following operating con-
straints:
(κ s) m · u s[k] ≤ g s[k] ≤ (κ s) M · u s[k], ∀s ∈ S , ∀k ∈ Ti (3.9)
g s[k]− g s[t− 1] ≤ (r s) + · 60, ∀s ∈ S , ∀k ∈ Ti (3.10)
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g s[t− 1]− g s[k] ≤ (r s) − · 60, ∀s ∈ S , ∀k ∈ Ti (3.11)
(1− u s[t− 1]) ≥ a s[k] ≥ u s[k], ∀s ∈ S , ∀k ∈ Ti (3.12)
(ψ s)4∑
k=1
(1− u s [k]) = 0, ∀s ∈ S (3.13)
(τ s) 4+k−1∑
i=k
u s[i] ≥ (τ s) 4 [u s[k]− u s[k − 1]] ,
∀s ∈ S , ∀k ∈ {2, . . . , K − (τ s) 4 + 1} (3.14)
K∑
i=(τ s)4+k−1
{u s[i]− [u s[k]− u s[k − 1]]} ≥ 0,
∀s ∈ S , ∀k ∈ {K − (τ s)4 + 2, . . . , K} (3.15)
(ψ s) 5∑
k=1
u s [k] = 0, ∀s ∈ S (3.16)
(τ s) 5+k−1∑
i=k
(1− u s[i]) ≥ (τ s) 5 [u s[k − 1]− u s[k]] ,
∀s ∈ S , ∀k ∈ {2, . . . , K − (τ s) 5 + 1} (3.17)
K∑
i=(τ s)5+k−1
{1− u s[i]− [u s[k − 1]− u s[k]]} ≥ 0,
∀s ∈ S , ∀k ∈ {K − (τ s)5 + 2, . . . , K} (3.18)
a s[k], u s[k] ∈ {0, 1} , ∀s ∈ S , ∀k ∈ Ti. (3.19)
The explained constraint (3.8) represents the power balance constraint
between the set of unit outputs g s[k] of the sellers in S and the net demand
for all subperiods k ∈ Ti.
Constraints (3.9) - (3.11) are equivalent to (3.2) - (3.4) explained in Sec-
tion 3.1 and represent each unit’s operating constraints.
Constraints (3.13) - (3.18) represent the minimum unit up-time and down-
time constraints for each seller s. We use the formulation of these constraints
as stated in [37].
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Constraint (3.19) defines the non-negative binary characteristic of the com-
mitment status variable u s[k] and startup status variable a s[k] across each
subinterval k for each seller s. The inclusion of such binary variables, as
noted in Chapter 1, makes solving the unit commitment an MIP problem
with all the computational burden it carries.
The economic dispatch for the DAM may be derived from the unit com-
mitment formulation by eliminating constraints (3.12) - (3.19) which involve
only binary decision variables and by fixing the binary variables in constraints
(3.8) - (3.11) at the optimal values obtained in the unit commitment.
From the DAM market clearing mechanism we obtain the optimal genera-
tion schedule (gs[k])∗ and commitment (us[k])∗ for each seller s ∈ S in each
subperiod k ∈ Ti. Additionally, we obtain the energy MCP for the DAM,
(λ[k])∗, for each subperiod k ∈ Ti.
3.3 Sub-hourly Market Clearing Mechanisms
In this section we present the market clearing mechanism formulation corre-
sponding to the IDM and RTM market settlements. We propose our own
formulation to link the DAM with the IDM and RTM taking into account
the information inter-dependence. To avoid repetition, equivalent constraints
from the DAM clearing model are not restated and are merely mentioned.
In addition, we discuss the incorporation of the RCP model into the market
clearing mechanism formulations.
The market clearing mechanism for the IDM unit commitment co-optimizes
the commitment of additional resources from the DAM with the objective
to minimize the total sum of the sellers’ offers as given by:
min
g s[k],u s[k],
a s[k],(d) †[k]
∑
k∈H f
{∑
s∈S
(
γ s(g s[k]) + ζ s · a s[k]
)
+ α · (d) c[k]
}
, ∀f ∈ F .
(3.20)
The power balance constraint required is equivalent to constraint (3.8).
Unit ramping and output constraints are equivalent to constraints (3.9) to
(3.12). Minimum up-time and down-time constraints are equivalent to con-
straints (3.13) to (3.18). We also add the non-negativity constraints (3.19).
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Furthermore, the IDM market processes must ensure the market outcomes
of the DAM. Equally, the RTM must ensure the market outcomes of the
IDM. To take this into account, the market clearing mechanisms in the IDM
and RTM need to incorporate the market outcomes of their respective previ-
ous market settlement. We use the previous market settlement to refer to the
settlement where the market outcomes are obtained. We refer to the current
market settlement as the settlement where the market outcomes must be en-
sured. In order to ensure the market outcomes, these are transferred in two
different ways. If the market outcome is related to a binary variable, such as
the unit status variable, then the value from the previous market settlement
is identically transferred to all contemporary subperiods of the current mar-
ket settlement. If the market outcome is related to a non-binary variable, the
value is transferred so that the changes in value between consecutive intervals
in the previous market settlement are linearized in the contemporary subpe-
riods of the current market settlement. We depict such transfer in Fig. 3.2
and formulate it mathematically in Table 3.1. Additionally, we define the
short notation (·)t to indicate transferred variables as show in the right side
of the table.
Figure 3.2: Market outcome transfer
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Table 3.1: Formulation of the market outcome transfers from k(`−1) to k(`) i,
ii
market (`− 1) outcome values transferred to market (`) function notation (`)(
y (`−1)[k(`−1)]
)∗ (
y (`−1)[C(k(`)/Π)])∗ H(y[k(`)])
binary decision variables
(
y (`−1)[k(`−1)]
)∗ (
y (`−1)[C(k(`)
Π
)]
)∗
,
(
y (`−1)[k(`−1) − 1])∗ +{(y (`−1)[C(k(`)
Π
)− 1]
)∗
H(y[k(`)])
+
(
y (`−1)[C(k(`)
Π
)]
)∗ }
·
(
C(k(`)
Π
)− k(`)
Π
)
non-binary decision variables
∀k(`) = {1 + (k(`−1) − 1) · R(Π), . . . , k(`−1) · R(Π)}
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To ensure the commitments determined in the DAM, the following con-
straint is introduced:
u s, (`)[k(`)] ≥ (u s, (`−1)[k(`)])t, ∀s ∈ S , ∀k(`) ∈ Ti, ` = 2 (3.21)
Constraint (3.21) forces a unit committed in the DAM, to preserve the com-
mitment status in the IDM. If the unit has not been committed, it can still
be committed as a result of the IDM market clearing mechanism.
In addition, it is required that the IDM ’s market clearing mechanism en-
sures the output schedules resulting from the DAM. To achieve this, we model
the energy offer function γ s(·) of each seller s as a piece-wise function:
γ s(g s[k(`)]) =

γ s,−(g s[k(`)]) ∀g s[k(`)] < H(g s[k(`)])
0 ∀g s[k(`)] = H(g s[k(`)]), ` = 1
γ s,+(g s[k(`)]) ∀g s[k(`)] > H(g s[k(`)])
(3.22)
where each seller s offers its scheduled DAM output (g s, (`−1)[k(`)])t at no
extra cost for the system, offers its additional output at a price γ s,+(·) and
is willing to reduce its scheduled DAM output at the price of γ s,−(·).
We proceed to introduce the RCPs in the formulation using the model
described in Section 3.1. The objective function (3.20) is modified to co-
optimize the scheduling of the RCPs and the energy and thus becomes:
min
g s[k],u s[k],
a[k],zs[k],(ξ) c[k]
∑
k∈H f
{∑
s∈S
(
γ s(g s[k]) + ζ s · a s[k]
)
+ α · (d)†[k]
+
∑
s∈S
(
(ρ s(z s[k]))+ + (ρ s(z s[k]))−
)
+ ω ·
((
(ξ) †[k]
)+
+
(
(ξ) †[k]
)−)}
, ∀f ∈ F , ` 6= 1.
(3.23)
The equivalent to the resource output constraint (3.9) is substituted by
constraints (3.2) and (3.3). Furthermore, we include constraints (3.4) to (3.6)
to represent the additional operating and balancing requirements imposed by
the RCPs.
iΠ = K(`)/K(`−1)
iiI( fr ) = max
{
integer in fr
}
; C( fr ) =
{
I + 1 fr > I
I fr = I
; R( fr ) =
{
I + 1 fr > I + 0.5
I fr ≤ I + 0.5
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Again, upon solving the market clearing mechanism for the unit commit-
ment, we eliminate the constraints where only binary variables appear and we
fix the binary variables at their optimal values in the rest of the constraints
to solve the economic dispatch for the IDM.
The formulation of the market clearing mechanism for the economic dis-
patch of the RTM is equivalent to the formulation of the market clearing
mechanism for the economic dispatch of the IDM. The only difference is the
need to account for the financially binding scheduled RCP amounts from the
IDM. To ensure the schedules, we proceed following the same methodology
used with the DAM market outcomes. We model the RCP offer function
ρs(·) for each seller s as a piece-wise function where the scheduled ramping
capability in the IDM is offered at no extra cost to the system:
ρ s(z s[k(`)]) =
{
ρ +, s(z s[k(`)]) ∀z s[k(`)] < (z s, (`−1)[k(`)])t
ρ −, s(z s[k(`)]) ∀z s[k(`)] > (z s, (`−1)[k(`)])t , ∀k
(`) ∈ Ti.
(3.24)
This equation is valid for each directional RCP.
3.4 Payments to the Sellers in the Hourly and
Sub-hourly Markets
We devote this section to formulate the multi-market settlement functions
that define performance metrics of interest to our work to assess the economic
impacts of the RCPs within our proposed market structure. We base our
multi-market settlement on that described by Stoft in [32].
The first metric of interest is the market clearing price (MCP) of a prod-
uct in our market structure. At the optimum in the economic dispatch, the
dual variable (λ[k]) ∗ (shadow price) of the power balance constraint (3.8) is
interpreted as the market clearing price for the energy (MCP). Consequently,
(λ (`)[k]) ∗ is defined as the MCP for each market settlement ` ∈ L . Simi-
larly, at the optimum in the economic dispatch, the dual variable (ϑ (`)[k]) ∗
(shadow price) of the RCP balance constraint (3.6) is interpreted as the RCP
market clearing price (RCPMCP) for each market settlement (`) ∈ {1, 2}.
The total payments to the seller s are defined as ς s. These are the sum of
the payments from the products cleared in the market settlements plus any
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additional uplift payments required. ς sc is defined as the uplift payment made
to seller s if it does not recover the start-up cost offer. The uplift payments
are common practice in the markets operated by many ISOs as seen in [38]
or [39] to ensure, among other things, full start-up cost offer recovery. Modern
gas turbines are able to start within minutes and are increasingly being cycled
multiple times a day to tackle unexpected deviations in forecast [40]. Some
of these cycles are not long enough for the turbines to recover the start-up
costs and as such cost recovery needs to be ensured and accounted for. The
total payments described are given by:
ς s =
∑
`∈L
ς s,(`) + ς sc , ∀s ∈ S . (3.25)
The total payments for the products cleared in the market settlements are
the sum of the individual payments for energy and ramp capability formu-
lated as ς se [k] and ς sw[k] respectively.
ς s,(`) =
{ ∑
k (`)∈Ti ς
s,(`)
e [k (`)] , ∀` = 1, ∀s ∈ S∑
k (`)∈Ti (ς
s,(`)
e [k (`)] + ς
s,(`)
w [k (`)]) , ∀` > 1, ∀s ∈ S .
(3.26)
The total payments for energy ς s,(`)e [k] are obtained as the product of the
market clearing price for energy (λ (`)[k]) ∗ multiplied by the optimal seller’s
output (g (`),s[k]) ∗ for the DAM. For the IDM and RTM, the corresponding
market clearing prices are multiplied by the imbalance outputs between the
current market settlement’s optimal output (g s, (`)[k(`)]) ∗ and the immedi-
ately preceding market settlement’s optimal output (g s, (`)[dΠe]) ∗:
ς s,(`)e [k
(`)] =

(λ (`)[k(`)]) ∗ · (g s, (`)[k(`)]) ∗ , ∀` = 1, ∀s ∈ S
(λ (`)[k(`)]) ∗ · {(g s, (`)[k(`)]) ∗ − (g s, (`−1)[C(k(`)
Π
)]) ∗
}
, ∀` > 1,∀s ∈ S .
(3.27)
Similar payment computations are shown in Eq. (3.28) to compute the total
payments for RCPs in the IDM and RTM. These include the opportunity
cost of the energy not provided by the unit cleared for ramping capability.
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ς s,(`)w [k
(`)] =

(ϑ (`)[k(`)]) ∗ · (z s,(`)[k])∗ +max
{
0, (λ (`)[k(`)]) ∗ · (z s, (`)[k(`)]) ∗
− γ((z s, (`)[k(`)] + g s, (`)[k(`)]) ∗) + γ((g s, (`)[k(`)]) ∗)
}
, ` = 2, ∀s ∈ S
(ϑ (`)[k(`)]) ∗ · {(z s,(`)[k])∗ − (z s,(` − 1)[C(k(`)
Π
)])∗
}
+max
{
0,
(λ (`)[k(`)]) ∗ · (z s, (`)[k(`)]) ∗ − γ((z s, (`)[k(`)] + g s, (`)[k(`)]) ∗)
+γ((g s, (`)[k(`)]) ∗)
}
, ` = 3, ∀s ∈ S .
(3.28)
We compute the uplift payment ς sc in Eq. (3.29) as either zero or the
difference between and sum of the start-up cost and energy costs scheduled
and the total payments in the market settlements, whichever is greater. This
ensures that the sellers recover all costs incurred by their units. Since the
ramp capability associated with RCP does not suppose an additional cost
to the units, the RCP offer is not accounted for. The sum of the start-up
cost offers cleared for seller s is given by the product of the start-up offer
ζ s and the optimal number of start-ups (a s,(`)[k(`)])∗ in the IDM. Note that
the number of start-ups for seller s in the IDM is the maximum number
of start-ups across all market settlements. The IDM commits additional
resources while ensuring the commitment from the DAM and the RTM does
not commit any additional units. The energy cost is determined by the
energy offer function at the scheduled amount in the RTM. Eq. (3.29) shows
the uplift computation:
ς sc =
∑
j∈J
max
{
0, ζ s ·
χ(2)+(j−1)·96∑
k (2)={(1+(j−1)·96)}
(a s,(2)[k(2)])∗
+
χ(3)+(j−1)·288∑
k (3)={(1+(j−1)·288)}
γ s((g s,(3)[k(3)])∗)−
∑
`∈L
ς s, (`)
}
,∀s ∈ S
(3.29)
where the payments are calculated for each of the days in our simulation
period. Note that to perform the comparative analysis for the case studies in
Chapter 5 only the metrics for the seven days in the middle of the simulation
period are used.
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter we described the incorporation of the RCPs in a flexible
market structure which explicitly represents these products across multiple
market settlements and allows us to assess their economic impacts in differ-
ent market processes in accordance with current market designs. We then
formulated the market clearing mechanisms that described the market pro-
cesses in our approach incorporating the RCPs into them. Moreover, we
described a procedure to compute the payments to the sellers that allows
us to calculate the performance metrics that are the basis for our economic
assessment. In Chapter 5 we describe the case studies we perform using the
simulation approach described in Chapter 4 with the markets cleared by the
market clearing mechanisms formulated here.
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CHAPTER 4
SIMULATION APPROACH
We devote this chapter to an overview of the simulation approach followed
in this work. As described in Chapter 1, the issue of operational ramping
flexibility entails a high degree of uncertainty and randomness. An analytic
solution to the problem at hand is not appropriate given such stochasticity
and uncertainty. As a consequence, we opt to use a practical approach based
on simulations. We choose a flexible stochastic simulation approach which is
the basis of the comparative economic assessment of the impacts of the RCPs.
Our approach balances the trade-off between capturing the uncertainty and
variability of the system’s elements and the computational intensity required
to simulate a detailed market structure within a large-scale system. As an
example, a single run of the multi-settlement market takes 339 minutes and
as a consequence efficient numerical and statistical methods are required to
enable the study We describe a Markov-based technique to model the error
present in the forecasts of VERs and the demand which allows us to represent
them.
4.1 Overview of the Stochastic Simulation Approach
In this section, we present the basic elements of the simulation approach.
With the simulation approach we want to assess the economic impacts of
the RCPs in a large-scale system taking into account the uncertainty and
variability of multiple inputs through a series of performance metrics. For
the purpose, we use a stochastic simulation approach based on the Monte
Carlo technique. We lean on the application of the Monte Carlo to the
DAM to select a set of weeks which represent the inherent uncertainty and
variability of the inputs. The DAM serves a triple purpose since it also
provides commitments and schedules for the IDM and its market outcomes
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are used to compute the performance metrics. We then model the IDM
and RTM inputs to account for the uncertainty in the sub-hourly market
settlements. With these inputs we clear the sub-hourly market settlements
for a series of case studies in order to perform the comparative analysis of
the impacts of the RCPs. In Fig. 4.1, we depict a conceptual flowchart of
the simulation approach where m.c.m. refers to the market clearing model
and p.t.s. to the computation of the payments to the sellers.
Figure 4.1: Simulation approach: conceptual flow chart
The simulation of the DAM is carried out over a period T . We decompose
T into non-overlapping simulation periods T i such that T =
⋃
iT i. We
define each simulation period T i in such a way that the resource mix, the
operating policies, the market structure and the seasonality effects remain
unchanged.
We define J , {j : j = 1, . . . , J} as the set of days within each simula-
tion period T i. For each market settlement the simulation period is defined
as T (`)i =
{
k (`) : k (`) = 1, . . . , K (`)
}
. We chose a total of nine days as
the load follows a distinctive weekly pattern and we need an additional day
at the beginning and end to obtain representative market outcomes. We use
the first day’s MCM s only as a means of obtaining realistic initial commit-
ments and schedules for the second day’s MCM s. The market outcomes from
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this first day are not used to compute the performance metrics. Again, the
market outcomes from the last day are not used to compute the performance
metrics. Note that K (2) and K (3) should not arrive until the ending period
of the ninth day; otherwise, we would require inputs from an additional day.
Since market outcomes from the ninth day are discarded, this choice of sim-
ulation period is acceptable. As shown in Fig. 4.2, in the end we use a J − 2
long subperiod to compute the performance metrics which are the basis of
the comparative economic assessment.
Figure 4.2: Example 9-day simulation period
Within each simulation study T we require two types of inputs: fixed
and simulation-period variant inputs. Our fixed inputs comprise all unit and
market parameters which remain fixed across market settlements as well as
across simulation periods. Such parameters, numerically defined in Chap-
ter 5, include for example a unit’s maximum output (κ s) M or a market
settlement’s penalty price for unserved energy α. Simulation-period variant
inputs include all the sources of variability and uncertainty which are desired
to be modeled and which motivate this study.
The sources of variability and uncertainty considered in the problem are
three: the demand forecast, the solar output forecast and the wind output
forecast. We declare these three elements as the stochastic inputs in the sim-
ulation approach. Additionally, we consider also the maintenance schedule of
specific units as a stochastic input within a set of deterministic constraints.
39
We define
{
D˜ [k] : k ∈ T i} as the random variable associated with the fore-
casted demand. Similarly, we define
{
W˜[k] : k ∈ T i} and {N˜ [k] : k ∈ T i}
as the random processes associated to the wind and solar output forecasts.
We define θ˜ s as the random variable associated to the maintenance sched-
ule of each seller’s resource. We define Ω {D˜ [k]:k∈T i} as the sample space for
the random process
{
D˜ [k] : k ∈ T i}. Similarly, we define Ω {W˜[k]:k∈T i} and
Ω {N˜ [k]:k∈T i} as the sample spaces for the random processes
{
W˜[k] : k ∈ T i}
and
{
N˜ [k] : k ∈ T i}. We define Ω {θ˜ s} as the sample space for the mainte-nance schedules. Forecast sample spaces are built using historical profiles as
detailed in Chapter 5. Within the historical profiles used, we maintain the
temporal connection between contemporary profiles used for different mar-
ket settlements. This way, we ensure that forecasting errors between market
settlements are faithfully represented.
4.2 Classification of the Input Sample Spaces
We want to capture the economic impacts of the RCPs under differentiated
sets of inputs that represent their different inherent variabilities. In this
section, we classify the input sample spaces so that the simulation approach
is able to capture such differences in the performance metrics. First, we must
declare that we perform all studies for differentiated seasons. As such, all
input sample spaces are built using differentiated seasonal historical data.
We use the solstice and equinox dates as the boundary days for the seasons.
As explained in [28], p. 156, the solution of a UC is highly computa-
tionally intensive. To increase the computational efficiency of the Monte
Carlo-based stochastic approach, we perform a clustering classification on
each of the seasonal demand forecast sample subspaces. We make use of a
k-means clustering method to classify the demand forecast seasonal sample
subspaces Ω {D˜ [t]:t∈T i} into Ω
c
{D˜ [t]:t∈T i}. This method is commonly used inthe literature for the classification of demand patterns and its performance
has been widely demonstrated as in [41,42]. Clustering allows us to perform
stratified sampling [43], p. 146, which is a variance reduction technique for
the Monte Carlo. As a result, we achieve an increase in accuracy without a
loss of computational efficiency. From this point on, the process described is
equal for each of the four seasons. To avoid over-notation, seasons will not
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be shown.
We define C , {c 1, c 2, . . . , c C} as the set of clusters in the simulation ap-
proach. We also define Ω c{D˜ [k]:k∈T i} as the demand forecast sample subspacefor cluster c. We declare that the clustered sample subspaces are exhaus-
tive and non-overlapping. We classify each demand forecast subspace into
an equal number of clusters. The demand forecast subspace properties are
formulated as:
Ω =
C⋃
e=1
Ω c e , , (4.1)
Ω c e
⋂
Ω c x = ∅, ∀e 6= x, ∀e, x ∈ {1, . . . , C} . (4.2)
4.3 DAM Monte Carlo Simulation Procedure
In this section, we describe the simulation approach for the DAM market
settlement. For the DAM, we chose a stochastic simulation methodology
based on the Monte Carlo technique. Since the RCPs are designed to tackle
uncertainty and variability in the system, the choice to use Monte Carlo is
appropriate as it allows us to capture multiple sources of both. We declare
that we apply the Monte Carlo technique independently to each of the in-
put clusters c ∈ C. We perform one Monte Carlo simulation run for each
simulation period T i. In effect, each simulation run is independent and the
outcomes of the Monte Carlo simulation of any given period have no bearing
on any other simulation period. In each simulation period, we effectively
solve a sequence of J consecutive DAM MCM s to map the input random
processes (i.r.p.s) into the output random processes (o.r.p.s) that represent
the DAM market outcomes. We provide a conceptual representation of such
mapping in Fig. 4.3.
We assume each of the Monte Carlo inputs to be an independent and
identically distributed discrete-time random process. We select the previ-
ously defined
{
D˜ [k] : k ∈ T i} as the discrete-time stochastic process repre-
senting the demand forecast for all subperiods k ∈ T i. Similarly, we select{
W˜[k] : k ∈ T i} and {N˜ [k] : k ∈ T i} as the discrete-time stochastic pro-
cesses representing the wind and solar forecasts for all subperiods k ∈ T i.
The random vector
{
Θ˜ : Θ s : Θ 1, . . . , Θ S
}
is defined as the vector of
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Figure 4.3: Monte Carlo simulation: conceptual representation
random processes representing the maintenance states for the units of the
set of sellers S , {s : s = 1, . . . , S}.
We begin each Monte Carlo simulation sampling the maintenance sched-
ule for each seller unit which remains fixed during all independent simulation
runs for that cluster. The maintenance schedule for each unit is planned on
a seasonal basis. We maintain a reserve margin on top of the peak demand
forecast. Such reserve is in line with industry standards such as that estab-
lished by the NERC [44]. To obtain the peak demand for each season we find
the maximum DAM demand forecast value in each of the demand forecast
clustered subspaces of each season. We define φ as the net qualifying capacity
requirement which is computed as the peak demand plus the reserve margin.
We define θ s as an i.i.d. random variable following a Bernoulli distribution
where a realization of 1 represents that the unit is undergoing maintenance
and a 0 that the unit is available. We refer to P as the probability that θ s is
equal to 1. All units are assumed to have an equal probability of undergoing
maintenance. We define the sum of the expected available capacity to be
equal to the net qualifying capacity requirement. We formally define this as:
P (θ s = 1) = P s, ∀s ∈ S
∑
s∈S
P s · (κ s)M = φ.
(4.3)
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We also assume that maintenance events for the units last for a full sim-
ulation period Ti and effectively retire from the system all of its nameplate
capacity. Maintenance schedules are fixed across the three market settle-
ments. This methodology to model maintenance is sufficient to represent the
fact that not all the generation fleet is always available without having to
perform a mid-term planning as is common practice.
Figure 4.4: Monte Carlo simulation: conceptual flow chart
We continue to perform a set of M r = {m r : m r = 1, . . . , M r} inde-
pendent simulations runs. For each simulation run, we sample the demand,
wind output and solar output forecasts i.r.p.s in order to create input sam-
ple paths (i.s.p.s) which are the basis of each simulation run. The i.s.p.s are
the means with which we map the output sample paths (o.s.p.s) that form
the output random processes (o.r.p.s). Note that we perform the sampling
process within Ω c{D˜ [k]:k∈T i} for each cluster c ∈ C , but within Ω {W˜[k]:k∈T i}and Ω {N˜ [k]:k∈T i} for each cluster c ∈ C. To clarify, we mean that the cluster-ing division only applies to the demand forecast sample subspaces and that
the solar output forecast and wind output forecast sample subspaces are the
same for all clusters inside the same season.
After the sampling process, we solve a sequence of J DAM MCM s for M r
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simulation runs. We effectively solve the DAM MCM s (formulated in Chap-
ter 3) to map the i.s.p.s into the o.s.p.s. We define
{
λ˜[k] : k ∈ T i} as the
o.s.p. for the o.r.p.
{
Λ˜[k] : k ∈ T i} representing the market clearing price
for all subperiods k ∈ T i. This is the basis o.r.p. which we use to select the
representative weeks for the sub-hourly markets. Additionally, we define the
o.s.p.s
{
g˜[k] : k ∈ T i
}
and
{
u˜[k] : k ∈ T i} for the o.r.p.s {G˜ [k] : k ∈ T i}
and
{
U˜ [k] : k ∈ T i} associated to the generation schedules and the genera-
tion commitments. We depict such simulation procedure in Fig. 4.4.
The choice of the total number of simulation runs M r depends on the sta-
tistical reliability requirements for the estimator of the o.r.p.. We focus on
the market clearing price as the o.r.p.s from which we determine the statis-
tical reliability requirements. We define λ¯[k] as the sample mean estimate of
the M r o.s.p.s of the market clearing price o.r.p.:
λ¯[k] =
1
M r
M r∑
mr=1
λ (mr)[k]. (4.4)
We chooseM r empirically when we visually determine that the improvement
in statistical reliability in the estimator of choice is too small to warrant the
extra computing time needed to perform additional simulation runs.
4.4 Approach for the Sub-Hourly Market Settlements
In this section, we explain the simulation approach for the IDM and RTM,
the sub-hourly market settlements. Based on an empirical analysis of the
large-scale system used and the average computational times taken to clear
the sub-hourly settlements, if we were to simulate the same number of runs
for the IDM and RTM as are simulated in the DAM, we would require a
total of 357 days. This is completely inefficient. We provide in Appendix D
the details of the analysis. We choose, based on this result, to select a set of
representative weeks for which we clear the sub-hourly market settlements:
one per cluster in C. This selection reduces the sub-hourly market settlement
simulation time to a more attainable duration of 4 days.
After we determine the choice of approach, we desire to obtain a represen-
tative week for each cluster c ∈ C that reflects the economic outcomes which
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result from the inputs of that specific cluster. Given this, we choose as a
representative week for each cluster that whose corresponding MCP o.s.p.
minimizes the mean square error with the o.r.p. sample mean estimator ob-
tained with the Monte Carlo technique. We effectively solve for each cluster
the following minimization problem to obtain the representative week:
min
m r
1
K
K∑
k=1
(λ¯[k]− λ (m r)[k])2, ∀m r ∈M r. (4.5)
As a result of solving the minimization problem, we obtain the index (m r) ∗
for the optimal simulation run which best represents the market outcomes
for the cluster. We chose the market outcomes and forecasts from these
corresponding weeks when solving the sub-hourly markets.
To clear the sub-hourly market settlements we require three types of inputs:
the DAM market outcomes, updated demand and VERs output forecasts and
the ramping capability demand associated to the RCPs.
Firstly, the DAM market outcomes are required by the sub-hourly market
settlements in order to honor the schedules and commitments represented
by these outcomes. We make use of the o.s.p.s g(m r) ∗ [k], u(m r) ∗ [k] and
λ(m r)
∗
[k]) for the selected simulation run (m r) ∗ as the inputs for the IDM
MCM s for each cluster.
Secondly, we require updated forecasts for the demand and VER outputs.
We base the updated forecast on historical data for the simulated sub-hourly
market settlements. Temporal correlation between the data used to simu-
late the same representative week in the DAM and that used in the IDM
and RTM is kept. Historical data used for the forecast refers only to the
financially binding subperiods in each market settlement. In the IDM and
RTM, the market settlement MCM s clear the market for the binding subpe-
riod as well as for a series of advisory subperiods; even though the later are
not used to compute the market outcomes. These advisory subperiods can-
not be solved using the historical forecast data as this would assume perfect
forecast and zero uncertainty. Instead, we introduce forecast error using a
Markov-process based technique which we explain in Section 4.5.
Thirdly, we discuss the ramping requirements which represent the demand
associated with the RCPs. We define the system aggregated ramping re-
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quirement to be:
ramping requirement = max
{
0, change in net demand
+ uncertainty
}
.
(4.6)
The net demand is defined as the demand forecast minus the wind and solar
output forecasts. For any given subperiod, for up-ramping capability the
change is the difference between the following subperiod net demand and the
current subperiod net demand. In contrast, for down-ramping capability the
change is the difference between the current subperiod and the following sub-
period net demand. In this way, if the net demand changes in the opposite
direction of the ramping capability requirement, then the requirement is re-
laxed. The uncertainty component is calculated as sum of the demand, solar
output and wind output historical forecast errors. Forecast errors for the case
studies chosen are discussed in Section 5.2. Ramping capability uncertainty
requirements are calculated equally for both up and down directions.
Based on these inputs discussed, we solve the MCM s for the second and
third market settlement as formulated in Chapter 3 to effectively clear the
sub-hourly market settlements. Using the market outcomes from the three
market settlements we compute the payments to the sellers. The market
outcomes together with the payments to the sellers are used to compute the
performance metrics which are discussed in Appendix D.
4.5 Markov-based Technique for Forecast Error
Modeling
In this section we present the methodology used to model the forecast error
for the demand and the solar and wind outputs. As mentioned, our sub-
hourly MCM s solve both financially binding as well as advisory subperiods
in each run. Every time an MCM is run for the same subperiod ki the
demand, solar output and wind output forecasts change for that subperiod.
For this reason, it is necessary that our simulation approach models a different
error for those forecasts every time they are used. The basis of our modeled
forecasts are the historical profiles used to create the sample spaces of our
input random processes. We make use of the unaltered historical profiles
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only for the financially binding subperiod of a certain MCM. Every time a
chosen profile is required for a advisory subperiod we model an error for it.
We require the error modeled for each advisory subperiod to be based on the
errors modeled for the preceding subperiods as well as on the real historical
profile. If the error were based only on the historical profile, then within each
run of an MCM the differences between the forecast and the historical profile
would average to zero. In contrast, if the forecasts were uncorrelated to the
historical profiles we could have incongruities such as the solar power output
increasing at night. For these, we use a Markov-based technique to model the
forecasts based on both the historical profiles and the previous subperiods’
errors. We adapt the technique which has been used in the literature for
short-term forecasting and error modeling [23, 45, 46]. In Fig. 4.5, we depict
a flowchart with the steps of the technique. We use {x[k] : k ∈ T i} as an
Figure 4.5: Forecast error modeling flowchart for MCM ki
illustrative i.s.p. to show the technique. We refer to {x[k]B : k ∈ Ti} as the
i.s.p. for all the financially binding subperiods in T i. We define χ (`) as the
number of subperiods cleared in each MCM for market settlement `. (χ (`)) B
is the number of binding subperiods and (χ (`)) A the number of advisory
subperiods. For a market clearing mechanism in subperiod ki, we select the
forecast
{
x[k] B : k ∈ {k i, . . . , k i + χ}
}
from the historical data sampled.
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To obtain an advisory forecast x[y] A for a subperiod y ∈ {k i, . . . , k i + χ}
we multiply the binding forecast for that period x[y] B by an error ε[y]. We
model ε[y] as a Markov process formally defined as:
ε[k i] = 1 (4.7)
ε[y] = ε[y − 1] · δ[y], ∀y ∈ {ki + 1, . . . , ki + χ} , (4.8)
δ[y] ∼ N (0, σ), ∀y ∈ {ki + 1, . . . , ki + χ} . (4.9)
We iteratively calculate the error ε[y] and the forecast for the advisory
subperiod x[y]A for the total number χ of advisory subperiods. The value of
σ and the number of advisory subperiods (χ (`)) A are discussed in Section 5.2.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we described the stochastic simulation approach we use to
perform the economic assessment of the RCPs, which takes into account the
inherent stochastic nature of the problem described in Chapter 1. We pro-
ceeded to describe the Monte Carlo technique used to simulate the DAM and
account for the variability and uncertainty of the inputs. Furthermore, we
explained how we make use of the Monte Carlo outcomes to select a set of
representative weeks for the simulation of the IDM and RTM market set-
tlements. We discussed the inputs that the sub-hourly market settlements
require and specifically we formulated a Markov-based method to model fore-
cast errors. In Chapter 5, we describe the case studies performed with this
simulation approach and present and discuss the results obtained with them.
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CHAPTER 5
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES
In this chapter, we present the results from the extensive case studies per-
formed to assess the impacts of the RCPs on the sub-hourly markets. We
discuss the scope and nature of the simulation studies with their objectives,
assumptions and key considerations. We describe the test system and the
data inputs used for the simulation. Furthermore, we present and interpret
representative results from the case studies.
5.1 Scope and Nature of the Case Studies
With our case studies, we desire to quantify the impacts of the RCPs in a
multi-settlement market structure so as to interpret the usefulness of these
products. More in detail, we wish to determine the impact of RCPs on
sub-hourly energy market clearing prices given certain RCP requirements
are imposed to the system. The objective is to quantify the impact both
in average prices and in the variability of those prices. Based on this, we
wish to demonstrate the effectiveness of such products in reducing market
price volatility. Also, we want to quantify the impact of such products in the
payments to the sellers. We want to differentiate the payments for energy
and RCP in order to assess the incentive they provide to flexible resources.
This will allow us to demonstrate the effective unbinding of the supply of
energy and ramp. We wish to do all this in a large scale system whose scale
and generation mix are comparable to those of an actual system in order
to obtain comparable quantifiable results. Furthermore, we want to perform
the simulations based on load and VER output data that are representative
of the conditions a real system has to face.
We perform two comparative case studies. In the base case, we clear the
DAM, the IDM and the RTM without modeling the RCPs. The second
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case study is equivalent to the base case but includes the RCPs. We force
RCP purchases by imposing RCP requirements in the IDM and allow for
the ramping capability to be delivered in both the IDM and RTM. The only
type of ancillary service modeled is the RCP. This allows us to analyze and
quantify the RCP isolated impact. Synergies with other ancillary services
are also discussed based on the results. It may be of interest in future work to
explore such synergies in depth. The DAM settlement is performed following
the approach described in Section 4.3, but we do not report its individual
results as this settlement is only performed to collect market outcomes for
the sub-hourly market settlements which are the basis of the studies. Fur-
thermore, since no RCPs are modeled in the DAM, it is of no interest to
separately report this market settlement’s outcomes.
For the unit commitment and economic dispatch processes, we make cer-
tain assumptions on commitment statuses and the bidding strategies of the
units. We assume that each seller in the system possesses a single resource
and as such commitments and bidding strategies are unique for each unit.
Biomass, coal and nuclear units are assumed to be base load units and as such
are always committed when not undergoing maintenance. For the geother-
mal units we apply a seasonal rating adjustment to the nameplate capacity
to model the behavior of this technology. We assume also that the sellers in
the system bid with a cost-based strategy. The sellers’ DAM energy offer
functions are defined as piecewise linear functions based on the short-run
marginal cost (SRMC ). No mark-up is added to the SRMC. We assume
that the SRMC is the sum of the variable operations and maintenance costs
(VOM ) plus the fuel cost. We consider constant start-up cost offers ζ for
the cycling units. We depict in Fig. 5.1 the offer curve profile described
for a generic unit in the case where the unit is not undergoing maintenance
and has all capacity available. Based on the analysis in [47] p.10, we model a
peak scheduling strategy for all hydro resources by using variable ratings. To
account for limited water availability, we cap the total energy produced by
the hydro units. Furthermore, we account for environmental constraints and
we add minimum and maximum release constraints in the forms of minimum
and maximum power output constraints for all hydro units.
For the IDM and RTM, we use the same methodology to build the unit
offer functions as in the DAM. When increasing output, the incremental
energy offer function γs,+(·) is a linear function intersecting the x axis in the
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Figure 5.1: Example of the DAM offer functions
scheduled output in the previous settlement and has a slope equal to the
SRMC. In contrast, the decremental energy offer function γs,−(·) is set to
zero. This offer curve is depicted in Fig. 5.2. Furthermore, we define the
Figure 5.2: Example of an energy offer function for the sub-hourly markets
RCP offer function for the sellers as a linear function at constant slope of
10% of the short-run marginal cost for each seller. At zero MW s offered,
the RCP offer function abscissa is defined as zero. We consider equal offer
functions for the up and down directions.
For the sub-hourly market processes, we assume the durations for the
subintervals are 15 and 5 minutes for the IDM and RTM respectively, both
of which correspond to the s.i.t.i.s of the market settlements. In addition, the
proposed market structure we consider, following the DAM, does not have
advisory subperiods. In contrast, in order to source the required ramping ca-
pability and capacity to meet the deviations in forecast, the IDM processes
look ahead 4.5 hours and the RTM 65 minutes. The choice is enough in both
cases to commit or re-dispatch additional capacity. We define it mathemati-
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cally as: (χ (1)) A = 0, (χ (2)) A = 17 and (χ (3)) A = 12. Shown in Fig. 5.3 is
the comparison between contemporary subperiods of the three market set-
tlements. For any given DAM subperiod indicated by k (1)i , there are four
contemporary IDM subperiods and twelve contemporary RTM subperiods:
Figure 5.3: Comparison of contemporary sub-periods in the three market
settlements
In order to clarify the temporal relations between the subintervals of each
market settlement and the duration of the SOPs for each of them, we depict
in Appendix B a temporal market structure diagram with numerical details.
5.2 Description of the Test System Data
We test our simulation approach in a system that emulates the CAISO gen-
eration fleet using the PLEXOS software [48]. We choose the CAISO as this
system possesses a multi-settlement market structure, is implementing its
own RCPs and also possesses a deep penetration of both VERs and gas-fired
flexible resources. In addition, the main assumptions outlined in Section 5.1
hold for this system. For example, the cost-based offer functions are consis-
tent with market practices for sellers in the CAISO operated markets [15],
p. 61., and the choices of s.i.t.i.s and number of advisory intervals coincide
with those in their market processes.
The system has a total of 1215 units and we base their characterization on
the eGrid generator database from [49]. From the primary fuel information
provided in the database we classify the system into the categories shown in
Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: CAISO system units
category # of units
biomass 207
coal 6
gas 537
geothermal 48
hydro 364
nuclear 2
oil 51
total 1,215
The sample spaces for the input demand and VER forecasts are created
using CAISO data from [50]. We use 2014 to 2016 data for the demand
forecasts and 2015 to 2016 data for the VER forecasts. The DAM input
data corresponds to the CAISO ’s DAM forecast data, the IDM data to
the RTPD forecast data, and the RTM data to the RTM forecast data. We
maintain temporal correlation between the forecast data used across the three
market settlements for each representative week. For the geothermal units
we apply a seasonal rating adjustment to the nameplate capacity based on
historical output data for the CAISO taken from [9]. The geothermal rating
is set equally across the day to imitate the base load behavior exhibited by
CAISO in [51] for such technology. To account for limited water availability,
we cap the total energy produced by the hydro units using historical hydro
production data from [9].
We model the demand forecast error using a normal distribution with a
0.01 standard deviation (σ). This choice is motivated by the average absolute
error in the hour-ahead forecast in the CAISO described in [52]. We also use
this value to compute the error for the IDM. We reduce the standard devi-
ation of the error to 0.005 for the RTM. As for the wind and solar forecast
errors we choose the standard deviation based in the percentage errors also
presented in [52]. For the RTM, as no forecast error is described, we assume
the standard deviation is reduced by half. We also compute the uncertainty
demand part for the ramping capability associated with the RCP using these
errors. At each interval we multiply the absolute forecast value by the stan-
dard deviation of the error to obtain the uncertainty component. We add the
contributions to the uncertainty component of the wind output, solar output
and demand forecast errors to the net load change component to obtain the
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total ramping capability demand.
The MCM s require that we characterize the operating constraints for each
sellers’ units. We use industry data to characterize the generators in each
category. We place special emphasis on the characterization of ramping and
start-up parameters which directly impact the results of our studies. Given
the lack of exact unit data, we characterize each unit’s parameters using
multiple industry and academic sources for each of the fuel categories. In
Appendix C, we detail the data as well as the sources and methods used for
the characterization.
Fuel costs are computed as the product between the heat rate taken from
[49] and the price for each unit’s fuel. We use public fuel prices from [53].
VOM costs and start-up offer costs are based on the cost information pro-
vided in [54]. We consider all renewable generation categories to offer at
zero cost. In Fig. 5.4 we depict the controllable unit supply nominal curve
for the units in our system. We observe that geothermal, hydro and nuclear
units represent our base load generation. Gas and biomass units represent
our load following power plants. Lastly, gas units (mostly gas turbines) and
oil units represent the peaking units in our system. We assume that VERs,
namely solar, wind and hydro, have zero fuel and VOM costs and as such
their power is offered at 0 $ / MWh.
The penalty price for unserved energy is set to 1000 [$/MWh] as it is in
the CAISO [55]. We define the RCP shortage penalty price as 100 [$/MWh].
5.3 Modeling Issues and Simulation Mechanics
In this section, we discuss a series of modeling issues and simulation mechan-
ics encountered during the case studies. Only issues and mechanics which are
relevant to the understanding of the studies or which provide useful guidance
for similar future studies are presented.
The main issue encountered when trying to solve MCM s for a large-scale
system is the great computational intensity of solving the MIP problem for
the unit commitment. In order to reduce the computational intensity, we
make use of unit aggregation [56, 57]. We evaluate different aggregations to
balance the trade-off between non-aggregated nameplate capacity and total
number of original units. An analysis of the CAISO system shows that there
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Figure 5.4: Controllable unit supply nominal curve
is a great number of small nameplate capacity hydro and gas units. These
units have a big impact on the solution time of the MIP associated with
the unit commitment but are of little relevance to the whole system as their
aggregate capacity is small. Base on this, and to be consistent, we aggregate
all units in each fuel category with a nameplate capacity of less than 10 MW.
This reduces the number of units from 1215 to 603 with 97% of the original
nameplate capacity intact and 3% aggregated. We create additional new
units for each fuel category with the aggregated nameplate capacity. For the
biomass and gas categories, based on the technical constraints of the units
aggregated, we choose to create two different aggregated units instead of one
to better represent the characteristics of the original units. A summary of
the aggregation is presented in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.
As for the simulation mechanics, we present the rationale for the selection
of three key parameters in our simulation approach: the number of clusters
for our input sample spaces and the number of simulation runs in the Monte
Carlo.
To select the number of clusters for the input sample spaces, we plot, as
55
Table 5.2: CAISO aggregated system analysis by # of units
category # of system # of intact units in # of aggregated units in
units modified system modified system
biomass 207 30 2
coal 6 6 1
gas 537 342 2
geothermal 48 35 1
hydro 364 179 1
nuclear 2 2 1
oil 51 9 1
1,215 603 9
total 612
Table 5.3: CAISO aggregated system analysis by nameplate capacity [MW]
category system intact capacity in aggregated capacity in
capacity modified system modified system
biomass 1,031.4 696.5 334.9
coal 299.4 299.4 0.0
gas 37,985.1 37,348.4 636.7
geothermal 2,115.5 2,057.5 58.0
hydro 10,222.6 9,604.9 617.7
nuclear 2,323.0 2,323.0 0.0
oil 496.1 451.2 44.9
54,473.1 52,780.9 1,692.2
total 54,473.1
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seen on the right of Fig. 5.5, the sum of the Euclidean distances between
the centroids of the clusters and each profile. We choose four clusters as a
good trade-off between the reduction of the sum of the Euclidean distances
and the increase in the number of clusters. We also present, on the left of
Fig. 5.5, the cluster centroids for the choice of four clusters. The centroids
are calculated for the datasets described in Sec. 5.2.
Figure 5.5: Clustering classification results
For the Monte Carlo, we determineM r = 100 to be an appropriate number
of simulation runs. Figure 5.6 shows the evolution of the market clearing
price estimator for cluster c 15 across 100 simulation runs. As we observe,
after 50 simulation runs the rate at which the statistical reliability improves
stabilizes, and we set 100 as the appropriate number of runs to balance
the above mentioned trade-off between reliability and computing-time. This
behavior is obtained for the whole set of C clusters.
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Figure 5.6: Monte Carlo: MCP sample mean estimate for cluster c15
5.4 The Economic Impacts of the RCPs in the
Sub-hourly Markets
In this section we discuss the results of our comparative case studies in the
sub-hourly markets. The case studies performed pinpoint the ability of the
RCPs to reduce price volatility resulting from the additional supply of ramp.
Extremely high price events are reduced to the expense of an increase in
prices during low net load periods. Additionally, we show the increase in
reliability in the IDM from the incorporation of the RCPs through a re-
duction in the expected unserved energy (EUE ). In general, we present the
results for week-long simulation intervals. Given the high MCP variability
in weekly patterns, we choose to present representative days when depicting
temporally correlated data to allow the extraction of clear conclusions. Any
representative day is computed as the average of its corresponding weekly
pattern. We choose to present separate results for each of the seasons so as
to yield conclusions on the different conditions emulated for each of them.
In order to discuss the specific impacts of the RCPs within each season, we
depict in Fig. 5.7 the seasonal IDM expected daily net load forecast patterns.
All seasons have in common a prolonged low net load interval until around
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subperiod 24 corresponding to the early morning. Then in the afternoon,
there is a progressive ramping of the net load until the peak net load in the
evening. This ramp ranges from around 10 GW in the winter to around 15
GW in the summer. During the night, the net load ramps down steeply in
an interval of just 3 hours. Particular to certain seasons, there are a series of
relevant features in the patterns regarding ramping. For the fall and winter,
the afternoon ramp is steep and short. In addition, it is preceded by a
short morning up-ramp and down-ramp. In contrast, during the spring and
summer, the afternoon up-ramp fuses with the morning up-ramp yielding
a continuous up-ramp all through the day. These features impact strongly
the units committed and dispatched, and hence the corresponding market
results.
Figure 5.7: Seasonal IDM expected daily net load forecast patterns
We provide the numerical statistics for the IDM MCPs in Table 5.4. We
observe a significant reduction in the expected standard deviation of the
MCP across all seasons. Thus, the RCPs are effective in reducing price
volatility in the IDM. Regarding the expected mean, we observe a reduc-
tion in the expected MCP mean across the year. These two results clearly
confirm the ability of the RCP to smoothen, homogenize and reduce market
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prices. However, if we look at the seasonal statistics, we observe that only
the smoothening and homogenization are uniform across all seasons. The
reduction of expected market clearing prices varies with the season, from a
14.2 % increase in spring MCPs to a 31.5 % reduction during summer.
Table 5.4: IDM MCP statistics [$/MWh]
season base case RCP case ∆%
spring expected 36.1 41.2 14.2%std. dev. 51.0 30.5 -40.2%
summer expected 56.9 39.0 -31.5%std. dev. 77.7 28.7 -63.0%
fall expected 48.4 43.5 -10.1%std. dev. 67.0 23.0 -65.6%
winter expected 62.0 67.1 8.2%std. dev. 83.6 32.5 -61.1%
yearly expected 50.8 47.7 -6.2%std. dev. 71.6 31.0 -56.6%
We compare in Fig. 5.8 the weekly IDM MCP duration maps for all sea-
sons. To compose this map, we align the MCPs of each of the 672 15-minute
subperiods in a week in decreasing order of magnitude. We highlight with
green stripes the periods where the RCP case expected MCPs are lower
than the base case MCPs. We highlight with a red striped pattern the areas
where the base case expected MCPs are higher. We observe that periods of
extreme high prices are reduced uniformly across all seasons. In those peri-
ods, with the RCPs the system commits more expensive slow-start resources
than average to provide additional ramping. When a non-forecasted ramp-
ing requirement arises, the system is able to meet it. Without the additional
ramping reserve, the system either incurs unserved energy or has to quickly
start some of the most expensive oil or gas units. In contrast, this additional
ramping reserve comes at a cost during periods when the reserve is not re-
quired. We observe that prices between 125 $/MWh and 25 $/MWh increase
evenly in all seasons except summer. Particular to the winter season, there is
an increase in subperiods with a price near or equal to 0 $/MWh. With the
low net load of this season, additional generation to meet the RCP demand
causes oversupply, which results in hydro units being the marginal unit and,
as a consequence, to 0 $/MWh market clearing prices.
These conclusions are confirmed when we analyze the impacts of the RCPs
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on the expected unserved energy (EUE ) and probability of a price spike
event1 across the seasons. In Table 5.5, we show the probability of a price
spike and EUE for the base and RCP cases across the four seasons. The
probability of a price spike is significantly reduced across all seasons. The
EUE is virtually zero for all the seasons in the RCP case.
Table 5.5: Probability of a price spike (p.p.s.) and EUE [MW-subperiod]
results for the IDM
season base case FRP case
spring p.p.s. 0.0093 0.0023EUE 3.20 0.002
summer p.p.s. 0.026 0.0007EUE 22.63 0.001
fall p.p.s. 0.0187 0.0004EUE 13.33 0.0004
winter p.p.s. 0.0190 0EUE 1.80 0
yearly p.p.s. 0.0183 0.0009EUE 10.24 0.00086
Next, we focus on the impact of the RCPs on the IDM MCP daily profile
across each season. In Fig. 5.9, we show the expected IDM MCP daily profile
for each of the four seasons. For the summer season, the RCPs are able to
eliminate most of the price volatility with minimum increase in the MCP
across low net load subperiods. During winter, extremely high MCPs are
reduced but with a significant increase in MCP during low load subperiods.
For the fall and spring seasons there are no significant periods with extremely
high MCPs. Despite that, RCPs reduce prices across the evening hours in
the fall. Spring MCPs are reduced in high-price-volatility periods such as
those around subperiods 54 and 84. Again, we confirm that in all seasons
the RCPs effectively and clearly eliminate extremely high prices. Peak prices
are delayed across all seasons as the additional ramping is able to meet the
system requirements. We observe that RCPs are effective for periods of high
net load with gradual increases or decreases over multiple-hour-long periods
such as in the summer afternoon up-ramp and in all the seasons’ evening
down-ramps. In addition, the RCPs are also effective in periods where the
system has a short and steep increase of net load such as the morning and
1Subperiod with a MCP of 1,000 $/MWh
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Figure 5.8: Seasonal weekly IDM MCP duration curves
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Figure 5.9: Seasonal comparison of expected IDM MCP for a typical day in
the season
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afternoon winter up-ramps. In contrast, we observe that in periods with low
net load and little or gradual ramp, such as the spring afternoon ramping
period or the winter afternoon valley, RCPs increase MCPs unnecessarily.
Based on this we conclude that the ramping requirements should be kept
demanding in the first two cases but could be loosened in the last case.
Next, we briefly discuss the impacts of the RCPs in the RTM. Given our
choice not to model any other type of capacity based ancillary services or
reserves, there is a significant increase in high price events caused by increased
unserved energy. This unserved energy is caused by a lack of capacity in the
system as the RTM only dispatches resources and has no ability to commit
new ones. The effect of the RCPs in the RTM is thus limited as they provide
ramping but not necessarily additional capacity.
In Fig. 5.10, we show the expected annual RTM MCP for a one-day pe-
riod. We observe that the RCPs have limited capability to reduce the price
volatility as most of this volatility is due to the lack of capacity in the system
to cope with deviations in the forecasted net load. Since the RTM cannot
commit any additional units and no other CBAS have been modeled, when
the deviation is larger than the marginal unit’s remaining output the system
incurs unserved energy. Despite that fact, during the evening ramp, we can
observe a reduction in the MCP from subperiods 216 to 252 due to the in-
creased availability of ramping in the system. With these we state that the
RCPs benefit more flexible resources as they are committed to the expense
of slow starting, less flexible resources. This implies that the RCPs provoke
a shift in the unit commitment and do not necessarily incur the commitment
of additional capacity. This effectively separates the effect of these products
as providers of ramp from those of the other CBAS which provide capacity.
In economic terms, this allows the prices of the FRP to effectively represent
the value of the ramping for which they are auctioned.
The expected RCP IDM MCPs obtained, tabulated in Table. 5.6, demon-
strate that our choice of RCP offers correctly positions the RCP MCPs below
regulation and spinning reserves and above non-spinning reserves. In addi-
tion, as with regulation averages, expected RCP MCPs in the up-direction
are higher than expected RCP MCPs in the down-direction. If we analyze
the expected seasonal RCP IDM MCP daily profiles, shown in Fig. 5.11, we
observe across all seasons higher prices for the RCPs in the up-direction as
either dedicated units need to hold back on production to leave room in case
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Figure 5.10: Expected annual RTM MCP comparison for a one-day period
Table 5.6: Comparison of the 2015 CAISO average CBAS MCPs and the
obtained expected RCP IDM MCPs in our study [$/MW vs. $/MW/min]
CAISO 2015 spring summer fall winter yearly
regulation up 5.15 4.88 5.99 6.01 5.51
regulation down 3.48 3.76 2.49 3.07 3.20
spinning 3.25 2.85 4.68 3.59 3.59
non-spinning 0.21 0.33 0.95 0.45 0.49
RCP case spring summer fall winter yearly
RCP up 2.28 2.86 1.64 1.25 2.01
RCP down 1.62 2.22 0.85 0.84 1.38
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the ramp requirement is deployed or additional marginal units are started to
meet the RCP requirements. In contrast, for the RCPs in the down direc-
tion, committed units can offer the products without having to modify their
production. Furthermore, for the RCPs in the up-direction, the results show
a symbiosis between the RCP MCPs and the hydro strategy modeled. As
the hydro production starts increasing from subperiod 55, the RCP MCPs
either decrease or stay stable despite increasing ramping requirements during
the afternoon ramp. The specific price pattern seen in the winter season is
due to the low net load which causes less flexible units to be committed and
as such leads to less ramping capability in the system. The introduction of
the RCPs means that some of the less expensive slow units are not commit-
ted to the expense of flexible, more expensive units. Overall, this benefits
the system because as show in Fig. 5.9, when unexpected forecast deviations
create a need for additional ramp, the system does not revert to the most
expensive quick-start gas or oil turbines or incur unserved energy.
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(a) RCP up direction
(b) RCP down direction
Figure 5.11: Seasonal comparison of expected IDM RCP MCP for a typical
day in the season
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5.5 The Economic Impacts of the RCPs in the
Payments to the Sellers
In this section we develop the results from the payments to the sellers de-
scribed in Section 3.4 for the case studies performed. We show in Tables 5.7
and 5.8 the total payments to generation for the base case and the RCP case.
We compare in Table 5.9 the total payments for both case studies.
Table 5.7: Expected weekly payments to the sellers for the base case
[thousand $]
source spring summer fall winter average
energy $ 124,010.9 $ 172,871.3 $ 146,294.6 $ 146,719.5 $ 147,473.6
RCP $ - $ - $ - $ - $ -
uplift $ 745.6 $ 1,222.5 $ 1,163.9 $ 743.6 $ 968.9
total $ 124,756.5 $ 174,093.8 $ 147,458.5 $ 147,463.2 $ 148,442.5
Table 5.8: Expected weekly payments to the sellers for the RCP case
[thousand $]
source spring summer fall winter average
energy $ 128,617.7 $ 163,065.8 $ 149,092.3 $ 144,910.7 $ 146,421.6
RCP $ 491.6 $ 606.6 $ 290.3 $ 245.2 $ 408.4
uplift $ 1,568.7 $ 2,252.6 $ 1,256.4 $ 1,896.4 $ 1,743.5
total $ 130,678.0 $ 165,925.1 $ 150,638.9 $ 147,052.4 $ 148,573.6
Table 5.9: Impact on the payments to the sellers from the base case to the
RCP case
source spring summer fall winter average
energy 3.7 % -5.7 % 1.9 % -1.2 % -0.7 %
RCP - - - - -
uplift 110.4 % 84.3 % 7.9 % 155.0 % 80.0 %
total 4.7 % -4.7 % 2.2 % -0.3 % 0.1 %
In terms of energy payments, the effect varies with the season. For seasons
with high ramping requirements or low ramping supply available, as is the
case for the summer or winter, the RCPs reduce the energy payments. In
contrast, for low ramping requirement seasons, the RCPs increase energy
payments. This agrees with the effects provoked in the MCPs. As such,
we state that RCP associated ramp requirements should be designed so as
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to differ in intensity for each of the seasons based on the ramping demand
and supply in the season. Overall, we observe that proposed ramping require-
ments impact the energy payments positively as they reduce yearly payments
by 0.7 %.
In contrast, we observe a profound impact in the uplift payments. The
additional commitments required to meet RCP demand mean that some
units do not recover their full costs and qualify for the payments. Overall,
uplift payments are expected to increase by 80% on average. The fact that
energy payments are reduced but uplift payments increase demonstrates that
the RCPs effectively shift from a market where flexibility and energy are
valued and paid together to a market where the payment for flexibility is
made only to the resources that provide it. In addition, flexible resources
that provide ramping are also awarded payments for RCPs and as such have
their flexibility valued. Furthermore, we must highlight that RCPs increase
the overall number of cycles in flexible units. As such, the reduction in the
unit lifetime from additional wear and tear should be translated into higher
offers.
When adding all the payments, the result in terms of total payments to the
sellers yields an average 0.1 % increase. As a result of this finding, we state
that the RCPs do not negatively impact the payments as the increase can be
neglected and the effects are balanced across the seasons. Furthermore, the
increase in uplift and RCP payments provides an incentive for flexible gen-
eration to provide flexibility through ramping to the system. This pinpoints
the ability of the RCPs to reward the value of the ramping capability as a
separate commodity from the energy.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we described the case studies we performed using our stochas-
tic simulation approach to assess the economic impacts of the RCPs. We be-
gan by discussing the nature and objective of the case studies and explaining
the test system used as well as the characterization of the different elements
in the test system. We showed with our case studies the reduction in MCP
volatility in the IDM from the implementation of the RCPs. We also showed
the decrease in mean MCP in the IDM. We showed the impact on MCPs
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across low-load periods. We demonstrated the increase in system reliability
as given by the reduction of the probability of price spikes and of EUE in the
IDM where the RCPs are purchased. Furthermore, we showed the limitation
of the RCPs to substitute other capacity-based products in the RTM as the
provision of ramping need not mean that additional capacity is also supplied.
Furthermore, we showed the impact in the multi-market settlement of the
introduction of the RCPs where we showed that RCPs effectively unbundle
the provision of energy and ramping capability and provide an incentive for
flexible resources to offer such products.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, we summarize the work presented in this thesis and discuss
some possible directions for future research.
6.1 Summary
In this work we have assessed the economic impacts of the flexibility ramping
products within a multi-settlement market structure in a large-scale system.
We have provided a temporal market structure that represents both the
day-ahead market settlement and intra-day market settlements. We have
developed a formulation that allows us to explicitly represent the flexibil-
ity ramping products across the intra-day markets. We have performed a
co-optimization among the just mentioned energy markets. We have formu-
lated the multi-market settlement to compute the economic impacts of the
RCPs on the energy payments to the sellers, on the RCP payments and also
on the uplift payments. Our assessment is based on a stochastic simulation
approach that leans on the Monte Carlo method and classification techniques
to account for the multiple uncertainties associated with our inputs: the de-
mand and the VER outputs. More specifically, we have classified our inputs
on a seasonal basis by means of clustering techniques to increase compu-
tational efficiency and gain insights and assess the impact across different
input patterns. Furthermore, we have solved the DAM clearing mechanism
using the Monte Carlo technique to select a set of representative weeks of
the system input conditions. We have leaned on the market outputs from
these representative weeks for our intra-day markets. We have developed a
test system that mimics the CAISO generation fleet and allows us to per-
form our case studies and obtain meaningful results on a large-scale system.
We have performed a set of comparative case studies based on the stochastic
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simulation approach. We have proposed a Markov-based stochastic approach
to model the forecast error in our demand and VER output forecast for our
case studies.
From the case studies performed, we have concluded that a market struc-
ture which includes RCPs is subject to smoother prices and sees a reduction
in price spike events caused by the lack of punctual ramp due to the sources
of uncertainty in our system, namely the demand, the wind output and the
solar output. We have determined the ability of the RCPs to reduce price
volatility in the intra-day markets. We have shown that the reduction in
price volatility comes at the expense of an increase in average prices across
low net load periods. As such, for smoother operations and market perfor-
mance, the market design should include incentives in high volatility periods,
ergo in high net load periods. Such products inherently provide the system
with a ramping reserve which equips the system operator with additional
levels of freedom when trying to maintain the power balance. Given the
unique nature of storage and its ability to provide ramp, there will still be a
big unknown impact of this technology on RCPs. Such impact will directly
affect those market settlements with a time horizon which concords with the
physical capabilities of the ESRs. We have shown this in our simulations
through the hydro resources modeled and through the impact of its energy
offering strategy. As a consequence, RCP designs need to be accommodated
to integrate the various ESR technologies in order to profit from their poten-
tial. In addition, we have shown the limited impact of the RCPs in the RTM.
The lack of reserve capacity is a bigger constraint in the RTM as the provi-
sion of ramping capability need not mean that capacity is also provisioned.
Derived from this conclusion, the need to assess the market interactions of
the various CBAS s arises. Such interactions will enable one to determine
the appropriate market rules and structure to ensure correct operation and
increased reliability in the system. Regarding the payments to the sellers, we
show that the incorporation of the RCPs provides an incentive to the sellers
to participate in offering the products as there is an increase in the payments
to such sellers when these are incorporated. The RCPs effectively unbundle
the provision of energy and ramp, rewarding the sellers separately for each
product and yielding clearer and more competitive prices for them. Still,
with current market designs, complete competitiveness cannot be achieved.
A socialization of the uplift payment allocation is needed to allow units pro-
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ducing for short periods to economically participate in the system. Overall,
through the various points made, we conclude that RCPs need to be consid-
ered, designed and improved not in isolation but in the context of a holistic
market re-design.
6.2 Possible Directions for Future Research
There are a number of natural extensions of the work presented here. Offer
strategies for the resources providing RCPs may be studied. The optimiza-
tion of the aggregated system-wide RCP demand as well as the optimal
relationship between the penalty prices of the energy and the RCPs might
be of interest to future researchers. The incorporation of flexible demand
for the energy and the RCPs might also be of interest to further assess the
interaction between the two commodities.
Another extension to the work concerns the market structure and the simu-
lation approach proposed. The multi-settlement market structure developed
can be further expanded to incorporate other capacity-based ancillary ser-
vices and to study their economic impacts and relations when co-optimized
along with the RCP. Transmission constraints could be incorporated to as-
sess their impact on the deliverability of the products. In parallel, the multi-
settlement market structure could be used to perform studies on price con-
vergence, virtual bidding and offer strategies across multiple markets, among
other topics. An increase in computational capability may enable Monte
Carlo based studies in the intra-day markets.
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APPENDIX A
NOTATION
A.1 General Notation
k : the discrete time variable that denotes a subperiod
T i : the simulation period i
T =
⋃
iT i : the study period
J , {j : j = 1, . . . , J} : the set of days within each simulation period T i
L , {` : ` = 1, 2, 3} : the set of hierarchical market settlements with `=1
for DAM, `=2 for IDM and `=3 for RTM
` : the discrete variable with values in the set 1, 2, 3 to indicate
a market settlement
χ (`) : the number of subperiods cleared in the SOPs of market
settlement `
T (`)i ,
{
k (`) : k (`) = 1, . . . , K (`)
}
: the set of subperiods k for the i th
simulation period for the market settlement `
F (`) ,
{
f (`) : f (`) = 1, . . . , F (`)
}
: the set of markets cleared within each
simulation period for the market settlement `
H (`)j, f ,
{
k (`) : k (`) =
(
f (`) + [j · F (`) − 1] · χ (`)) , . . . ,(
χ (`) + f (`) + (j · F (`) − 1) · χ (`)) } : the set of subperiods k for the SOP
of market settlement ` for day j for the [f (`)]th market run
S , {s : s = 1, . . . , S} : the set of market sellers
C , {ci : c 1, . . . , c C} : the set of clusters in the simulation
M , {m : m = 1, . . . ,M} : the set of simulations in the Monte Carlo
approach for the simulation run M
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For a real valued decision variable x, we define the following:
(x) M : the upper bound of variable x
(x) m : the lower bound of variable x
(x) + : the variable x in the up direction
(x) − : the variable x in the down direction
(x) ∗ : the optimal value of the decision variable x
x (`) : the variable x in market settlement `
x|m : the realization of variable x in the simulation run m
(x) t : the optimal value of the decision variable x transferred be-
tween consecutive market settlements
A.2 Random Variables (r.v.s) and Random Processes
(r.p.s)
X˜ : a discrete random variable with realizations given by the set
X ,
{
x 1, . . . , x |X |
}
x : a realization of random variable X˜
Θ˜ , [Θ˜ s ... Θ˜ 1 ... . . . ... Θ˜ S] T : vector representing the variables associated tothe maintenance schedules of the set of sellers S
℘ p : probability that a resource is undergoing maintenance in sea-
son p
φ p : net qualifying capacity requirement as determined by the
reserve margin in season p
{X˜ [k ] : k ∈ T i} : discrete stochastic process defined for all subperiods k ∈T i
{x [k ]: k ∈ T i} : a sample path of the realizations of each r.v.
{
X˜ [k] : k ∈ T i}
Xˆ˜ : Given a set of i.i.d. r.v.s {X˜ i : i , 1 , . . . , N} we use Xˆ˜ todenote the estimator of a parameter of the distribution of X˜
Ω {X˜ [k ]:k∈T i} : sample space of
{
X˜ [k] : k ∈ T i}
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Ω p : sample space for season p
Ω p, c : sample subspace for cluster c for season p
{D˜ [k ]: k ∈ T i} : discrete random process that represents the demand fore-cast defined for all the subperiods k ∈ T i
{W˜ [k ]: k ∈ T i} : discrete random process that represents the wind forecastdefined for all the subperiods k ∈ T i
{N˜ [k ]: k ∈ T i} : discrete random process that represents the solar forecastdefined for all the subperiods k ∈ T i
{Λ˜ [k ]: k ∈ T i} : discrete random process that represents the realized mar-ket clearing price defined for all the subperiods k ∈ T i
{G˜ [k ]: k ∈ T i} : discrete random process that represents the realized re-source outputs defined for all the subperiods k ∈ T i
{U˜ [k ]: k ∈ T i} : discrete random process that represents the realized gen-eration commitments for all the subperiods k ∈ T i
{Z˜ [k ]: k ∈ T i} : discrete random process that represents the realized totalpayments to the sellers defined for all the subperiods k ∈ T i
{λ [k ]: k ∈ T i} : sample path that represents the market clearing price
{g [k ]: k ∈ T i} : sample path that represents the resource outputs
{u [k ]: k ∈ T i} : sample path that represents the resource status for all
subperiods k ∈ T i
{z [k ]: k ∈ T i} : sample path that represents the total payments to the
sellers
A.3 Market Clearing
In the notation, each seller is assumed to own a single resource whose outputs
are sold through the market.
(x)4 : the variable x from the start-up of a resource to the shut-
down of a resource
(x)5 : the variable x from the shut-down of a resource to the start-
up of a resource
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γ s(·) : energy offer price function of seller s resource with the ar-
gument that specifies the quantity of the capacity during the
period [k]
(ρ s) +(·) : seller s RCP up offer price function
(ρ s) −(·) : seller s RCP down offer price function
ζ s : the start-up offer price of seller s resource
g s : the seller s resource output
u s : the seller s resource commitment status
a s : the seller s resource operating status
(z s) + : the ramping rate provided in the up-direction by the seller s
resource
(z s) − : the ramping rate provided in the down-direction by the seller
s resource
κ s : the capacity of seller s resource
(r s) + : the maximum ramping up rate of the seller s resource in MW
per minute
(r s) − : the maximum ramping down rate of the seller s resource in
MW per minute
(τ s)4 : minimum up-time of seller s resource
(τ s)5 : minimum down-time of seller s resource
(ψ s)4 : number of subperiods that the seller s resource must be ini-
tially online due to its minimum up constraint
(ψ s)5 : number of subperiods that the seller s resource must be ini-
tially oﬄine due to its minimum down constraint
(ξ) + : total aggregated up ramping rate required
(ξ) − : total aggregated down ramping rate required
ς s : total payments to the seller s
ς se : total energy payments to the seller s
ς sw : total RCP payments to the seller s
(d) † : unserved energy
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(ξ) † : unserved ramping requirements
α : penalty price for unserved energy
ω : penalty price imposed on unserved ramping requirements
ϑ+ : up-ramping rate market clearing price in $/MW /min
ϑ− : down-ramping rate market clearing price in $/MW /min
∆ : ramp duration in minutes
{x m [k ]: k ∈ T i} : sample path of
{
X˜ [k] : k ∈ T i} corresponding to thesimulation run m
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APPENDIX B
TIME STRUCTURE OF THE
MULTI-SETTLEMENT MARKET
In this appendix, we depict the multi-settlement market structure used in
the simulation approach. The structure is composed of three settlements.
The first settlement, referred to as ` = 1, is equivalent to the DAM market
settlement which commits supply to meet the forecasted demand for the
following day. The settlement clears twenty-four 1-hour time intervals. After
this market settlement is cleared, the next two settlements, which are intra-
day market settlements, allow the system to economically balance supply and
demand deviations. These market settlements, as depicted in Fig. B.1, act
upon the same time frames as the DAM. The IDM, shown as ` = 2, solves
eighteen 15-minute intervals. Of those, only the first is binding. The fact
that the settlements solve an additional 17 intervals allows the system to
commit and dispatch resources to meet larger deviations caused by mistaken
forecasts of demand or intermittent resources. This process is repeated every
15 minutes as shown. In addition, the RTM, the last settlement shown as
` = 3, solves thirteen 5-minute intervals. This settlement allows the system to
balance the final deviations in forecasts by re-dispatching units to meet such
deviations. As with the IDM, only the first interval solved is binding. With
this scheme, the operator can economically commit and dispatch resources
within a system with deep intermittent resource penetration.
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Figure B.1: Time structure of the simulated markets
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APPENDIX C
TEST SYSTEM CHARACTERIZATION
In this appendix we provide the parameters and corresponding sources used
to characterize the units in our test system. Biomass units are modeled as
gas units when the unit’s fuel is gas-based and as coal units when the unit’s
fuel is of wood-waste type.
Table C.1: Minimum stable level as % of nameplate capacity
value source
coal 35 - 40 [58]
gas - combined cycle 20 - 60 [59]
gas - combustion turbine 20 - 60 [59]
geothermal 10 [60]
hydro 3 [61]
nuclear 50 [62]
oil 0 [63]
Table C.2: Ramping capability as % of nameplate capacity
value source
coal 0.9 - 5.5 [62,64]
gas - combined cycle 5 [62]
gas - combustion turbine 8.3 [62]
hydro 50 [65]
oil 50 [63]
Table C.3: Minimum up-time and down-time in hours
up-time down-time source
gas - combined cycle 3 2 [66]
gas - combustion turbine 2 1 [66]
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APPENDIX D
COMPUTATIONAL DETAILS AND
PERFORMANCE
D.1 Computational Details of the Case Studies
In this section we provide the run times for the simulations performed. The
times for the DAM simulation runs are shown in Table D.1. The times for the
IDM base case simulations are shown in Table D.2. The times for the IDM
RCP case simulation are shown in Table D.3. Note that for the IDM only
one representative week is simulated for each cluster. The simulation times
for the RTM are negligible compared to the IDM and DAM as it is an LP
and not an MIP ; thus, these times are not shown. We observe a significant
increase in computation time in the RCP case given by the introduction of
the additional constraints imposed by these products.
We depict in Table D.4 the simulation time of a hypothetical simulation of
100 weeks of the IDM for both cases. These times are based on the average
simulation times obtained in the simulations performed. We observe that we
would require a total of 358.61 days to solve 100 weeks of the IDM market
settlement.
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Table D.1: DAM simulation solver performance results
Iterations (week) Simulation Time (min.)
Cluster 1 100 123
Cluster 2 100 141
Cluster 3 100 138
Cluster 4 100 132
Cluster 5 100 178
Cluster 6 100 176
Cluster 7 100 138
Cluster 8 100 138
Cluster 9 100 196
Cluster 10 100 190
Cluster 11 100 190
Cluster 12 100 182
Cluster 13 100 134
Cluster 14 100 134
Cluster 15 100 117
Cluster 16 100 105
Average 100 151
Total 1600 2412
Table D.2: IDM base case simulation solver performance results
Iterations (week) Simulation Time (min.)
Cluster 1 1 54.00
Cluster 2 1 65.42
Cluster 3 1 37.33
Cluster 4 1 36.58
Cluster 5 1 43.97
Cluster 6 1 44.75
Cluster 7 1 48.00
Cluster 8 1 45.38
Cluster 9 1 70.60
Cluster 10 1 50.93
Cluster 11 1 61.02
Cluster 12 1 81.18
Cluster 13 1 39.13
Cluster 14 1 32.28
Cluster 15 1 33.45
Cluster 16 1 35.75
Average 1 48.74
Total 16 779.78
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Table D.3: IDM RCP case simulation solver performance results
Iterations (week) Simulation Time (min.)
Cluster 1 1 297.15
Cluster 2 1 227.05
Cluster 3 1 236.83
Cluster 4 1 222.62
Cluster 5 1 203.00
Cluster 6 1 259.63
Cluster 7 1 308.00
Cluster 8 1 185.10
Cluster 9 1 101.82
Cluster 10 1 172.67
Cluster 11 1 233.17
Cluster 12 1 115.60
Cluster 13 1 211.80
Cluster 14 1 227.97
Cluster 15 1 257.92
Cluster 16 1 1123.88
Average 1 274.01
Total 16 4384.20
Table D.4: Hypothetical 100 week IDM simulation time analysis
Simulation Time
(min.) (days)
IDM base case 77978.33 54.15
IDM RCP case 438420.00 304.46
Total IDM 516398.33 358.61
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D.2 Calculation of Performance Metrics
In this section we present the calculations required to compute the perfor-
mance metrics which allow us to analyze the results of the case studies. We
aggregate the market outcomes and payments to sellers into seasonal or yearly
values to obtain the performance metrics. The outcome or payment value
for a single cluster by itself is not representative of a season. In addition,
values from multiple clusters do not represent seasons equally. Therefore, we
calculate each seasonal market outcome y pi based on a weighted average of
the values obtained in each cluster:
y pi =
4+(i−1)·4∑
e=1+(i−1)·4
y p i, c e ·
rank(Ω p i, c e{D˜} )
rank(Ω p i{D˜})
, ∀p i ∈ P . (D.1)
Similarly, an annual market outcome y is calculated as:
y =
P∑
i=1
4+(i−1)·4∑
e=1+(i−1)·4
y p i, c e ·
rank(Ω p i, c e{D˜} )
rank(Ω {D˜})
(D.2)
Both aggregated metrics are based on the relative size of the clustered de-
mand forecasts sample subspaces. For the purpose of this computation we
assume that all profiles inside a sample subspace or sample space are linearly
independent so that the rank is equal to the total number of profiles inside
each subspace. With this method, values from different clusters are weighted
based on the historical frequency of occurrence of the demand profiles in the
cluster. The total number of weekly profiles used in each subspace for the
Monte Carlo is presented in Table D.5.
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Table D.5: Input sample space analysis
# of profiles implicitprobability
demand wind solar season annual
sp
ri
ng
c1 8
13 13
0.308 0.077
c2 8 0.308 0.077
c3 8 0.308 0.077
c4 2 0.077 0.019
su
m
m
er
c5 6
13 13
0.231 0.058
c6 1 0.038 0.010
c7 13 0.500 0.125
c8 6 0.231 0.058
fa
ll
c9 7
13 13
0.269 0.067
c10 5 0.192 0.048
c11 5 0.192 0.048
c12 9 0.346 0.087
w
in
te
r c13 4
13 13
0.154 0.038
c14 12 0.462 0.115
c15 8 0.307 0.077
c16 2 0.077 0.019
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